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Abstract 
 
This work analyses and defends Wittgenstein's definition of mathematical objectivity, looking 
particularly at his account of mathematical proofs, of what makes them normative, and what 
role mathematical and linguistic practices play in their establishment. It aims to provide a 
clearer view of Wittgenstein's idea that the objectivity of proofs is inextricably rooted in 
empirical regularities, detected within what he calls our 'form of life', and which are in turn 
constituted by both regularities in nature and regularities in human practices. To accomplish 
this, the thesis makes an exhaustive analysis of Wittgenstein distinction between proofs and 
experiments. Drawing from Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, this paper addresses 
important criticisms that have hindered a serious study of his remarks on mathematics, and 
vindicates his arguments as cogent, solid accounts of mathematical necessity and practice. 
This exploration will show that mathematical proofs do not have to be regarded as tools for 
the discovery of mathematical truths, of any sort, that depict mathematical facts, but can be 
correctly characterised as norms that produce new understanding, forming new concepts to 
deal with reality, and which ultimately affect the very limits of intelligibility, of what we can think, 
express and do. Thus, a philosophically relevant link between mathematical proofs and 
possibilities of action is set.  
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On Wittgenstein's notion of the objectivity of mathematical proofs 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper analyses the account of mathematical proofs that Wittgenstein develops in later 
works like the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1937-1944, henceforth RFM) 
and the Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics (1939, henceforth LFM). Wittgenstein's 
remarks on mathematical proofs have been widely discussed and included in many debates, 
but I believe some of the most valuable insights to be gathered from them are either still 
written in fragmentary form or get somewhat lost in broader arguments, like in Wittgenstein's 
criticism against the philosophical search for foundations for mathematics. I argue here that 
we can gain important philosophical results through a study that centres on his analysis of 
proofs and mathematical practice, one that carefully examines Wittgenstein's claim that proofs 
produce conceptual changes in our understanding, a claim which in turn criticises the more 
standard definitions of mathematical objectivity and argues it is ultimately anchored in practice 
and mathematical abilities. By highlighting the relevance of the role mathematical practice 
plays in the establishment of proofs, the thesis also makes important links between 
philosophy of language and philosophy of mathematics. 
 The first chapter introduces general mathematical concepts, proofs and theorems with 
which we will work throughout the paper. Section 1.2 and its subsections present the reader 
with Wittgenstein's account of language and mathematics in order to gain a better grasp on 
his remarks on the normativity of proofs and the relation between the latter and actual 
mathematical practice. Section 1.3 ends the chapter on a critical note on Wittgenstein's views, 
mainly highlighting remarks on their alleged conventionalism and lack of correction criteria, on 
the one hand, and on the other also noting the apparent incoherence of considering proofs 
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conceptual changes, that is, how this contradicts the intuitive notion of mathematical 
discovery. 
 The second chapter addresses such criticisms and dispels misinterpretations of 
Wittgenstein's remarks on proofs, drawing from relevant connexions between his philosophy 
of language and philosophy of mathematics. It digs deeper into the meaning of notions that 
are usually left undefined or neglected as unimportant, even mistaken, in his philosophy, such 
as 'form of life' and the 'hardening' of empirical regularities. This section also develops a 
positive account of Wittgenstein's philosophy of proofs by clearing up its solid definition of 
mathematical objectivity, drawing a clear distinction between the latter and the objectivity of 
empirical sciences. Section 2.1 contains the replies to the criticisms of the first chapter and a 
defence of Wittgenstein's account. Section 2.2 elaborates on Wittgenstein's distinction 
between proofs and experiments using the concepts of 'form of life' and 'conceptual change' 
examined in the first chapter. Yet it also traces important links between empirical and 
mathematical statements by explaining how mathematical rules are shaped by empirical 
regularities and, in turn, how mathematical order gives shape to every intelligible expression, 
including of course any statement that describes the empirical world. 
 The final chapter summarises the achievements and shortcomings of Wittgenstein's 
account of mathematical proofs. It pays special attention to the visual metaphors that his 
account draws, like the idea that a proof does not reveal new truths but rather makes us see 
new physiognomies, and explains how such observations relate methodologically to the view 
that philosophical progress consists in providing a clear view over the entanglements of 
language, a synoptic vision that clarifies the correct use of expressions. This also motivates a 
reflection on Wittgenstein's arguments' heavy reliance on geometrical metaphors, and 
suggests his account must cover more ground and extend to arithmetic and other areas of 
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mathematics if it is to be convincing. Finally, some concluding remarks and questions are 
added regarding the need to clarify further what kind of modification could a proof produce in 
mathematics, and if such is indeed a conceptual change. 
 
I will use the standard abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s works: 
 
TLP – Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
PI – Philosophical Investigations 
RFM – Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
PG – Philosophical Grammar 
LFM – Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics (Cora Diamond, ed.) 
OC – On Certainty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Chapter I 
Understanding mathematical proofs 
There is an open philosophical discussion questioning if and how mathematical proofs 
establish truths about mathematics. At first glance, questioning if proofs establish truths at all 
may seem odd, for we certainly have solid, growing, mathematical knowledge, whose tenets 
we regard as necessary, irrefutable; and this is due, presumably, to their unquestionable truth.  
Mathematicians, engineers and every person acquainted with basic arithmetic use 
mathematical operations with utmost certainty. After some education, we understand that the 
results we obtain in our basic, day to day calculations or geometrical constructions can be 
rigorously proved if needed, for there is a set of axioms and theorems that firmly supports 
them and justifies our use of them. But, regardless of this solid trust in mathematical 
knowledge, we are less prepared to explain what would seem like very basic features of it: 
what are mathematical statements about? What do mathematical laws rule over? How, if at all, 
can they be distinguished in detail, for instance, from laws of nature or laws of logic? It soon 
becomes difficult even to clarify what a mathematical proof says in a non-redundant way, that 
is, without appealing to the principle that is established by it or to the inference rules that were 
used to derive it. This would just be restating the proof, which may turn out to be the only 
answer we can provide in the end, but this dissertation joins the efforts that question if it is 
possible to know more about what a proof establishes, aiming to understand what it means 
within mathematics and as a new piece of knowledge. 
 This chapter introduces a general, standard notion of mathematical proofs and 
presents some examples to get a better idea of what proofs look like, how their steps are 
derived, and the philosophical questions they raise regarding what they are about, what they 
demonstrate and also why they are endowed with logical necessity. I will then introduce the 
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way Wittgenstein approaches such questions. To be able to understand and criticise his 
analysis, two crucial clarifications are in order: first, what does Wittgenstein contend by 
defining mathematics first and foremost as an activity which is embedded within a particular 
'form of life'? Is a 'form of life', whatever it may mean, a relevant concept to understand 
mathematics? And secondly, how, if at all, could we make sense of mathematical proofs being 
'conceptual changes'? How could a proof change mathematics? 
 Having obtained a better grasp of Wittgenstein's research questions, his philosophical 
approach and the arguments he develops to explain the norm-like nature of mathematical 
proofs, the chapter addresses some of the most relevant criticisms of Wittgenstein's views. I 
will point out their importance as much as their strengths and flaws. The point of this 
extensive, albeit necessary, preliminary groundwork is to eliminate misunderstandings many 
commentators have raised and that have become long-standing exegetical obstacles that 
have hindered a serious study of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematical proofs. It is also 
useful to keep these criticisms properly spelled out and close at hand, since they must be 
dealt with to locate Wittgenstein's position in the philosophy of mathematics' landscape, which 
is on its own a rather complex task. But more importantly, understanding these criticisms will 
provide guidance to see what Wittgenstein's remarks are really up to, where they fall short of 
sound explanations and also where they strike a particular vein of promissory, fruitful 
philosophical research. It will become evident that the crux of this debate between 
Wittgenstein and his critics is the concept of mathematical objectivity. Very simply put, 
Wittgenstein's critics firmly deny that a cogent account of mathematical proofs, with a clear 
definition of the nature of mathematical objectivity, can be accomplished within his unorthodox 
outlook. The last part of the chapter brings together and structures the criticisms that have 
been advanced, and introduces the next chapter proposing a way of reading Wittgenstein's 
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views on proofs that does preserve a solid account of mathematical objectivity. 
 
1.1 Some preliminaries 
It is commonly accepted that mathematics is, to put it in neutral terms, a sector of research in 
the quest for truth (cf. Dummett, in Jacquette, 2002; and Brown, 1999), in a similar way as 
empirical sciences are also involved in such quest. But we need a more detailed explanation 
of how mathematics specifically contributes to it. A common standpoint is to say that 
mathematical statements assert something about numbers, geometrical figures, angles, 
spaces and the like, in an analogous way as propositions of the empirical sciences assert 
truths about the empirical world, energy, subatomic particles, tectonic plates and so on. Both 
mathematical and empirical statements seem to assert that something obtains. The former 
state that, say, an equivalence, a numerical expansion, a pattern or order, is the case. Yet 
mathematical statements are also different from empirical propositions because whatever is 
equalled, expanded or ordered is nothing that we observe in space and time, nothing affected 
by causality, nothing contingent. Moreover, mathematical statements can be logically proved, 
beyond doubt, as correct. 
 Philosophy has tried to make sense of this elusive, non-empirical content of 
mathematical proofs. Depending on the philosophical stance adopted, one might understand 
that mathematical proofs lead to discoveries of abstract objects, their properties and relations; 
or perhaps to new mathematical structures or more basic and effective rules to formalise 
mathematical knowledge. One might consider that mathematics describes an abstract realm 
which is different from and independent of our empirical reality, and equally independent of 
our thoughts. This last idea is the fundamental tenet of mathematical platonism, a 
philosophical and mathematical view in which 'mathematical objects are there and stand in 
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certain relations to one another, independently of us, and what we do is to discover these 
objects and their relations to one another. [...] For the platonist, the meaning of a 
mathematical statement is to be explained in terms of its truth-conditions; for each statement, 
there is something in mathematical reality in virtue of which it is either true or false.' (Dummett, 
1959, p. 325) To cite an important alternative to platonism, the formalist account of 
mathematics, on the other hand, defends the existence of mathematical objects, but 
considers these are the very mathematical formulae and symbolism we use to express truths 
in mathematical language, so there is no need to talk about objects like perfect circles or the 
set of real numbers. Proofs, on the other hand, are legitimate objects. 
 In any case, we can see that images of a 'mathematical domain' where mathematical 
facts obtain are not hard to conjure up. To illustrate this more convincingly, let us consider a 
particular example, the proof that √2 is irrational. In the proof, we make the hypothesis that 
the opposite holds, i.e. we entertain the possibility that √2 is rational, and then demonstrate 
that this would be logically contradictory, forcing us to reject the hypothesis and accept that √2 
is indeed irrational. The reasoning we will use to derive the proof is rigorous and based on 
clearly defined concepts. 
 We can start by defining the kinds of number in question: 
 
A rational number can be expressed as the ratio of two integers, p and q, or in other words 
the fraction p/q, where p and q are integers and q ≠ 0. p and q have no common divisors. 
Since it is possible that q = 1, all integers are rationals. (That is, 1 = 1/1, 2 = 2/1, 3 = 3/1...) 
Rational numbers can also be expressed as decimals of finite length or decimals that show a 
repeating pattern. 
Examples of rational numbers: 8, 3/5, 0.3125, 0.2954545454..., -27. 
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Irrational numbers cannot be expressed as fractions, nor as finite-length decimals nor as 
repeating-pattern decimals. Examples: π, 2.645751311..., 1.4142135623... 
 
Rational and irrational numbers together make up the set of real numbers. 
 
A square root of p is a number q such that q2 = p. Any positive integer has 2 square roots, one 
positive, one negative. Example: √16 = 4 and -4, since (4)2 and (-4)2 = 16. 
 
We also must note that the square of an even number is even, that is, 
For an integer n, the square of the number 2n is 4n2, which is evidently even 
 
And the square of an odd number is odd, 
For an integer n, the square root of 2n + 1 = 4n2 + 4n + 1, which is odd 
 
Now, to the proof. We will use these definitions to prove that the hypothesis that √2 is rational 
contradicts itself. This move is a reductio ad absurdum: 
 
Suppose we can express √2 as the ratio of two numbers, p and q, which, as explained above, 
have no common divisors. We would have 
(1) √2 = p/q 
therefore,    
(2) 2 = (p/q)2 
(3) 2q2 = p2 
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Now, we are dealing here with squares of even numbers, since we are multiplying one side of 
the equation by 2. Since the square of even numbers is even, we would have 
(4) p = 2r 
r is another integer. Now we substitute this in the equations above. We have 
(5) 2q2 = 4r2 , therefore 
(6) q2 = 2r2 
Now, q is also even, so that 
(7) q = 2s 
and s is another integer. 
p and q, as we can see in lines (4) and (7), do have the common factor 2, which contradicts 
our hypothesis that √2 can be expressed as the ratio of two numbers which have no common 
divisors. Therefore, to avoid this contradiction, we must accept that√2 is irrational. 
 The reductio, as we can see, crafts a very compelling argument, established with full 
certainty, for we cannot turn our back on what is logically correct and fall into contradiction, 
invalidating all the reasoning we've built. The effect of the reductio is something like this: it is 
as if we traced a path of sound reasoning and arrived at a crossroad where, if we affirm the 
hypothesis that we've been entertaining, we would end up losing our own ground, our own 
traced path, so we have no option but to go the other way and deny the hypothesis in order to 
stay on track, so to speak. That is, we rather retrace our steps than lose our very possibility of 
moving. But what, then, constitutes these grounds we cannot afford to lose? 
 A platonist account would take the proof at face value and consider it an ontological 
statement that reports that there cannot exist a rational number r such that r = √2, or that √2 
has the property of being irrational. These statements become a description of how the 
number-theoretical landscape is constituted, what can, as it were, fit within it and what cannot. 
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Many mathematicians have adopted such stance, affirming that there exists such a landscape 
and that '[m]athematical theorems are true or false; their truth or falsity is absolute and 
independent of our knowledge of them' and that '[i]n some sense, mathematical truth is part of 
objective reality.' (Hardy, quoted in Brown, 1999, p. 10) 
 But Benacerraf's (1973) old dilemma reminds us that sticking to the platonist picture in 
mathematics has its costs. The platonist must explain what mathematical truths are about and 
how we can apprehend them, i.e. how we have mathematical knowledge. They must also 
clarify if we are to have one uniform notion of truth, one that is equally applicable to any 
meaningful sentence in language, so that we can say, for instance, that it is true that 2+2=4, 
and it is also true that sodium and chloride make salt. In other words, we must be able to 
explain if the truth-conditions of empirical and mathematical judgements have the relevant 
parallels (Benacerraf, 1973, p. 663), even if they are not identical. One way to give these 
explanations may begin by arguing that mathematics simply deals with more fundamental 
aspects of reality. For example, while chemistry studies interactions between particles, 
mathematics reveals the very geometric nature of their spins and molecular arrangements. 
That would explain mathematical statements' higher degree of certainty: however molecules 
may arrange, they will arrange in an identifiable geometrical shape. On the other hand, the 
platonist can also object against Benacerraf's constraints on mathematical truth. After all, a 
demand for an epistemology of mathematics that is continuous with that of the physical 
sciences ignores significant differences between them. 
 Furthermore, it is possible to reject platonism and endorse another philosophical and 
mathematical account that still cares to preserve a notion of mathematical truth. As we briefly 
introduced above, formalism understands mathematical knowledge as knowledge of the rules 
to manipulate logical symbols and formulae, to master logical syntax in proof-derivations. In 
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Hilbert's formalism, for instance, statements about infinity, which platonism counts as  
legitimate, are seen as problematic and ultimately are rejected. For infinity is nowhere to be 
found in reality, not in nature, nor in rational thought (Hilbert, in Benacerraf and Putnam, 1998, 
p. 201). The mathematical truths that are upheld in the formalist view do not affirm that 
mathematical facts obtain in the mathematical landscape, but talk about the consistency of 
mathematical structures. A proof, rather than a number or a triangle, is an example of a 
concrete and identifiable mathematical object, which can be described and which has 
properties (like that it does not lead to contradiction) (Hilbert, in Benacerraf and Putnam, 1998, 
p. 199). 
 In the following pages, I will argue that it is both possible and fruitful to analyse the 
epistemological contributions of mathematical proofs without notions of truths about abstract 
or formal objects, but rather, following Wittgenstein's approach, as conceptual developments 
that transform the possibilities of thought and action, so that mathematics must be understood 
as a relevant constituent of the way we think, develop understanding, form concepts, and act. 
This approach offers the possibility of making a sharper distinction between truth-apt and non-
truth-apt propositions, of highlighting the unique nature of mathematical necessity, as well as 
taking a closer look at the relation between a proof and mathematical practice proper. 
 
1.2 Wittgenstein's approach: conceiving mathematics as a rule-governed activity 
Wittgenstein strongly disagrees with the philosophical analyses briefly described above. He 
does not merely reject platonism and formalism to provide a better account of what 
mathematical proofs talk about, but rather considers that the very research questions of the 
mentioned programmes are wrongly put. That is, he questions if it is at all cogent to say that 
proof-derivations assert some kind of content (i.e. that they say something about abstract or 
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formal objects), or in other words to say that proven statements are truth-apt (that, for 
instance, the proof of the irrationality of √2 expresses a truth about the properties and 
constitution of irrationals), and that it is philosophy's task to explain what these contents are. 
His criticism of the content of mathematical statements can be traced back to writings as early 
as the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (published in 1922, henceforth TLP). In 6.21 he argues 
that truth and falsity can only be attributed to two kinds of propositions: logical propositions, 
which are tautologous or contradictory, i.e. always true or always false; and factual 
propositions, which can be true or false depending on what they depict, that is, if they do or 
do not picture a fact that effectively obtains in the physical world1. Notoriously, he does not 
classify mathematical propositions (and explicitly calls them pseudo-propositions, TLP 6.2) 
into either of these categories. He considers them neither logical nor factual, though does not 
fully explain why. Interestingly, yet too briefly, he mentions that philosophy must pay special 
attention to the use of expressions in mathematics, that asking ourselves what an expression 
does will lead to productive results (TLP 6.211), perhaps hinting at future developments in his 
writings concerning the links between the uses of an expression and the determination of its 
meaning. In any case, at this point, mathematical pseudo-propositions are regarded not as 
propositions which have a content, which are 'about something', but as vehicles which guide 
us from contentful expressions to the derivation of more contentful expressions, preserving 
their sense. That is, much like logical inferences, mathematical operations would preserve the 
truth-aptness of factual propositions. To put a very simple example, I can report that, say, 
there are 3 apples in my basket. Then if someone else tells me they added 2 more apples to 
my basket I will rightly make the judgement that there are now 5 apples in my basket, and this 
                                                 
1Of course, strictly speaking, he also discusses 'elementary propositions' and gives a complex explanation of 
what makes them true, but I believe this conception is endemic to the Tractatus and will not affect the current 
investigation on proofs, so we need not stop to give a full account of them. 
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would be a true judgement. Of course, this is because I follow the arithmetical operation 3 + 2 
= 5. If I look inside my basket and see there are not 5 apples there, but only 4, I will judge, 
again truly, that the person who reported they had added 2 more was lying or that one apple 
was removed before I checked, etc. The operation I will not put in doubt, the operation that 
will be a guideline in my judgements, will remain 3 + 2 = 5. 
 In the Philosophical Investigations (published in 1953, henceforth PI) Wittgenstein 
analyses language as a practice. He investigates the possibilities of expressing meaningful 
statements in common scenarios of linguistic exchanges, interested in the way linguistic rules 
are actually followed, and on determining what is the actual source of the logical compulsion 
that, say, prevents the simultaneous use of mutually contradictory judgements. Importantly, 
Wittgenstein continually draws strong links between language and mathematics, and notices 
the wider, similar philosophical questions we can ask about the meaning of linguistic and 
mathematical statements. Take, for instance, the fact that senseless combinations of words, 
like 'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously' can easily be formulated in language and, 
furthermore, are structurally correct. This makes it difficult to rigorously determine the 
meanings of expressions (i.e. if and how the meanings of constituent parts add up to give 
meaning to the sentence) and the correct use of language, and has led philosophers and 
logicians to construct formal languages in which there is lesser risk of ambiguities. But then, 
Wittgenstein asks, can we also say that we can think senseless things? (PI §513) How would 
we do that? In mathematics, he goes on, we find that some sentences do not immediately 
strike us as senseless, though after thorough investigation it turns out they are, in a way. This 
happens with mathematical conjectures, i.e. unproved mathematical statements which look 
like sentences we can understand, yet, Wittgenstein remarks, whose sense is to be 
determined. This way of understanding conjectures, of course, stands opposed to the 
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platonist understanding, in which the mathematical conjecture will be very much like a 
scientific hypothesis: a truth-apt statement whose truth is to be determined, its sense is 
already clear. Here's an example of what Wittgenstein wants to highlight, he asks   
 
'Does the sequence 7777 occur in the development of π?' (PI §516) 
 
The question perhaps invites to picture the sequence '7777' inserted in a row of random 
numbers at some point in the expansion of π, so we could say it is a perfectly intelligible idea. 
Yet it takes more than imagining '7777' just as easily as we can imagine '4159' occurring in π. 
As it turns out, it is more than highly likely that such sequence occurs in π, but there is no 
available proof that it does. Therefore, if there were a proof that '7777' cannot occur in π, then 
we would have to conclude that some mathematical proofs may lead us to conclude we 
cannot imagine something we thought imaginable (PI §517). To put a more tangible example, 
suppose we learn how to construct a pentagon with ruler and compass, we master how to do 
the measurements, the lines, the circles, and once we have done it a couple of times we are 
quite entitled to imagine the process is fairly similar if we want to construct other polygons. 
We think, for instance, that we can construct a heptagon and even 'set our minds to it', that is, 
imagine where some lines and vertices would go, the circles we would trace, etc. Yet, for all 
that, it is impossible to construct a heptagon with ruler and compass. 
 The relevant questions here are a) if it is always clear what a mathematical statement 
is about, and b) what would the consequences be if it isn't. Is '7777' already there in π, just 
'too far away' for us to see it? Could Fermat really have known what his famous conjecture 
was about? Is the latter question another way to ask 'did he actually have a proof?'? 
Questions concerning the 'aboutness' of mathematics are difficult to deal with when it comes 
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to open mathematical statements like conjectures. This, Wittgenstein would want to say, is a 
shortcoming of the philosophical analyses that read mathematical statements as if they 
expressed truths. Wittgenstein suggests an alternative approach: to analyse mathematics as 
a practice, and mathematical expressions as rules that govern such practice. This has proven 
to be a double-edged initiative. On the one hand, analysing the practice of mathematics is an 
important philosophical task, and one must be prepared to account for the undoubtedly 
effective use of mathematical calculations and models to investigate the universe. Yet, a 
seemingly undivided focus on the practical aspects of mathematics makes many doubt the 
seriousness of Wittgenstein's intentions. In other words, philosophers doubt if Wittgenstein's 
approach neglects primordial, more abstract areas of mathematics, higher mathematics and 
pure mathematics. But before passing judgement, let us look at what he really is up to. 
 Wittgenstein wants to analyse mathematics in a similar way as he analyses language, 
looking into 'rule-following' and communal, public linguistic use. He observes that 
mathematical rules share many features with linguistic ones: they can be followed in a precise 
enough way, precise enough for specific purposes, and this is in great part due to perceptions 
of sameness and regularity shared by communities, features of language we often dismiss as 
trivial. Wittgenstein, however, puts them at the very centre of philosophical debates about the 
meaning of expressions when he affirms that ‘[t]o understand a sentence means to 
understand a language. To understand a language means to be a master of a technique.’ (PI 
§199) In other words, to understand what a sentence means I must have a grasp of the 
linguistic rules that govern it. Grasping these rules requires that I know my way around the 
language where the sentence belongs. And finally knowing my way around it means I know 
how to use the language effectively. Wittgenstein takes the above notion of technique to mean 
something similar in mathematics, that is, mastering a mathematical technique will be 
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considered an ability to 'move around' mathematics, to understand and manipulate 
meaningful expressions within it. 
 Late in the RFM, Wittgenstein reminds us that '[o]nly in the practice of a language can 
a word have a meaning’ (VI §41). He writes this in the context of an exposition that stresses 
that we must understand and analyse mathematics as essentially a rule-governed human 
activity, intertwined with language, and part of other activities and institutions that may not 
appear salient to us, but that are fundamental for any mathematical reasoning to take place. 
For example, he asks '[c]ould there be arithmetic without agreement on the part of calculators? 
Could there be only one human being that calculated? Could there be only one that followed 
a rule?' (RFM VI §45, emphasis mine) 'Language', for Wittgenstein, 'relates to a way of living. 
In order to describe the phenomenon of language, one must describe a practice, not 
something that happens once' (RFM VI §34). Philosophy's task is to make such descriptions 
of the practices that make up language and mathematics. To do so, Wittgenstein claims, one 
must understand that mathematics is set within a form of life. 
 
1.2.1 Form of life 
To imagine a language, Wittgenstein argues, we must imagine the form of life where it has a 
use (PI §19). The point of this remark is to draw our attention to the fact that language is an 
activity that does not occur in a vacuum, that there are physical and cultural contingencies, as 
well as practical purposes, that have necessarily shaped what language can and cannot 
express, and to highlight that this is not a trivial matter. The language we use becomes 
something like a home we inhabit and a platform from which we articulate our judgements. 
We distinguish if someone is using a language by comparing their use of expressions to the 
way we communicate. 'The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by 
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means of which we interpret an unknown language.' (PI §206) This means there has to be 
enough regularity and order in a language for us to recognise it as such. 
 We must also understand that there are multiple uses for different expressions in 
different linguistic contexts, many languages, as it were, within language. Wittgenstein 
explains that this variety produces different, dynamic language-games. The purpose of the 
analogy with games is to give an idea of the variety of uses of words and phrases, of the 
malleability of language. Just as activities as varied as chess, rugby and 'ring a ring o' roses' 
can be considered games we play, so do activities like giving and obeying orders, describing 
and measuring objects, constructing objects from a description, reporting and speculating 
about events, doing scientific investigations, joking, translating, etc. (PI §23). Terms like 
'world' or 'reality', for example, play different roles when we predict facts and when we make 
them up.  Wittgenstein's purpose is to contrast this account of language against philosophical 
aims to unveil the one underlying logical structure of language, as if language functioned for 
homogeneous purposes. 
 Wittgenstein argues that, according to our necessities, new types of languages, or 
language-games, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten (íbid.). 
Think of how the scientific discourse on astronomy, for instance, has changed through history. 
Galaxies and elliptic orbits were unheard of, and now they are a common concept even for 
the non-experts. They are now necessary to describe the universe, whereas concepts that 
presupposed the Earth was the centre of the universe have been neglected. Interestingly 
enough, in this same section, where he underlines the varieties of language-games, 
Wittgenstein compares these linguistic dynamics to mathematical changes, though, again, he 
does not elaborate on the comparison. I will now elaborate on the relation between language-
games, mathematics and mathematical changes, and the concept of 'form of life'. 
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 One major problem is that the account of 'form of life' is as ambiguous as it is ambitious. 
It is supposed to do nothing less than supply the standards of mathematical objectivity, and 
explain how mathematics is a rule-governed activity, yet more than a run-of-the-mill kind of 
game, indeed an activity on which intelligibility hinges. But at the same time it is difficult to tell 
if a form of life is more than just a sociological account of human development or if it is a 
legitimate philosophical concept, if it plays a relevant role in the constitution of mathematics or 
if actually mathematics gives it its form. In short, it is hard to tell if mathematics is how it is due 
to our form of life or if it is the other way around. 
 Now, Wittgenstein understands that our form of life is not just a minimal condition, 
prerequisite or setting needed for mathematics to occur. The notion of form of life simply takes 
into account that language and mathematics form and develop the way they do due to 
specific physical and human settings into which linguistic and mathematical agents are born 
and where they develop uses, customs, expectations, fears, certainties. The purpose is to 
highlight that mathematics is an activity which arises in our form of life and therefore interacts 
with it, shaping the possibilities of action, imagination, thought. Avigad (2008) points out that 
there is something of a reciprocal relationship between mathematics and understanding, that 
just as we speak of understanding theorems, proofs, solutions, definitions, concepts, and 
methods, 'at the same time, we take all these things to contribute to our understanding.' (pp. 
320-321) So, going back to the question above, Wittgenstein seems to argue that our form of 
life is constituted at the same fundamental level as our mathematics, that they have to be 
understood in unison, instead of one depending on the other. 
  It is not Wittgenstein's interest to do a historical or anthropological study of what were 
the particular events that constituted forms of life in which language arose and how they 
specifically came to be, but simply to point out that such forms of life are given and we cannot 
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ignore them (PI II xi, p. 226), but rather must actively include them in our philosophical 
investigations. We simply have to work with them. To accept them, however, does not, and in 
fact cannot, amount to passively resign ourselves to our lot and take this acceptance as an 
enlightening explanation of why the world is how it is, why we think how we do and why 
mathematics happens to be the way it is. There remains to explain what role mathematics 
plays in our lives. We have a special conception of mathematics, 'an ideal of its position and 
function' (RFM VII §19), and this needs clarification. 
Wittgenstein asks 
‘What is the criterion for the way [a] formula is meant? Presumably the way we always use it, the way we 
were taught to use it. We say, for instance, to someone who uses a sign unknown to us: “If by «x!2» you 
mean x2, then you get this value for y, if you mean √x, that one”. –Now ask yourself: how does one 
mean the one thing or the other by «x!2»? That will be how meaning it can determine the steps in 
advance.’ (RFM I §2, and a very similar version in PI §190) 
 
‘And how does the way we mean it come out? Doesn’t it come out in the constant practice of its use?’ 
(RFM I §10) 
Just what we take as our 'constant practice' or constant use of expressions needs to be more 
clearly defined. There is a risk of being too ambiguous and leave room for considering that 
mathematical expressions assert truths, that there is a notion of mathematical content behind 
our practices, something which Wittgenstein definitely wants to avoid. Such stance involves 
thinking that we follow rules and formulae because they correspond to some (empirical or 
abstract) reality. Wittgenstein warns that in our daily use of language we talk as if some 
propositions already follow from others even if we haven’t framed them explicitly in syllogistic 
form; or we describe things as if we believed, say, that a straight line already connects two 
points; or assume that the transitions that correspond to the continuation of a series, like the 
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sequence of natural numbers, are already done, and that we are just, in a sense, merely 
‘tracing’ all of these relations (RFM I §21). We think that they depict facts that obtain. Just 
think of simple, apparently harmless statements like ‘the shortest distance between two points 
is a straight line’, ‘5 is the successor of 4’. They seem perfectly true and uncontroversial. 
What is not so simple is the whole picture of mathematics they seem to carry with them. From 
the way these statements are framed it is easy to assume that, and certainly very easy to talk 
about, the fact that one number is really the successor of another, that is, that they share a 
relation of proximity perhaps analogous to the relation between two substances that are 
always found together in nature, or mixed in a definite proportion or ratio that is always the 
same, like in ionic compounds. We can understand it as the fact that '5 always follows 4 in the 
natural number series', as if the 'act of following' occurred in some sense, and that the relation 
'b follows a' indeed happens due to some fact or property that makes one readily and 
uniquely available to place after the other. As in the proofs explained above, we conjure up an 
image of mathematical objects, properties and relations obtaining. 
 Instead, Wittgenstein argues that when we perform a mathematical operation, like 
when we work out a calculation, but also when we derive a proof, we should not consider that 
the reason we derive unique, necessary results is because the rules of inference correspond 
to some sort of reality. ‘Here what is before our minds in a vague way is that this reality is 
something very abstract, very general, and very rigid. Logic is a kind of ultra-physics, the 
description of the “logical structure” of the world’ (RFM I §8). We invoke superlative 
philosophical facts, like that all the movements a machine could possibly do are already 
present in the machine's diagram, comparing its future movements to objects that are lying in 
a drawer and we take out (PI §193). Against these deceiving pictures, Wittgenstein affirms 
that philosophical explanations of the way we signify in language and calculate in 
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mathematics, or reasons why we follow rules as we do, will at some point give out and not 
because we have reached the most logically simple components or foundations of language 
or mathematics, but rather because all that sustains language and mathematics is our 
agreement in action, which is how it is thanks to our shared form of life (PI §211, §217). 
 Wittgenstein elaborates on this in RFM III §58: to say that it is a fact that, say, 129 is 
divisible by 3 or that it is true that it is divisible by 3 is not problematic so long as we recognise 
that we are not asserting a fact dependent on mathematical reality and independent of our 
mathematical techniques. He suggests we try conceiving it more like a fact of the calculating 
technique, reminding us that properties of numbers do not exist outside the calculating. It 
seems natural to think we discover that 129 is divisible by 3 some time in our mathematical 
training. But on a second look, we have to admit that if we followed the techniques of 
multiplication and division correctly, then it is no surprise we got such a result. '129 is divisible 
by 3' is then more accurately described as a correct application of the operation of division, 
not a true statement that refers to a discovery about numbers and their properties. It certainly 
looks a lot like a discovery, for instance if we are looking for a way to shelve 129 magazines in 
3 cabinets of the same size. We make the calculation and we are entitled to say we 'found' a 
way to sort them. While it is also true that we do not foresee or already apprehend the results 
of relatively long mathematical operations, it is slightly misleading to call them discoveries as 
if we stumbled upon them unexpectedly. Even if we indeed ignore how much is, say, 762 
times 2521, we cannot say its result surprises us, for we figure out the result employing a 
well-known technique we employ daily, not by noticing some sort of fact. Mathematical 
statements, Wittgenstein wants to say, are not truths, not even overdetermined truths, but 
rather rules. 'This must be the result' means there is no open question left about the 
calculation. There is only one possible output given the rules of transformation in the 
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technique. Because of this normative character, every correctly performed operation is itself a 
rule, in a sense. We will expand on this below, on the next chapter, on the distinction between 
proofs and experiments. 
 It remains, no doubt, an empirical fact that we calculate in certain ways, that is, we can 
describe how we physically, day by day, calculate, prove and measure on blackboards, paper 
and computer programmes. Yet, Wittgenstein writes, that does not make the propositions 
used in calculating into empirical propositions (RFM VII §18). Again, the empirical ways we 
happen to write down numbers, carry sums, draw symbols, are the way they are for some 
historical reasons, but that is not the philosophical answer we are looking for when we 
enquire about the nature of mathematics. 
 To explain the role played by our form of life in mathematics Wittgenstein highlights 
how heavily the meaning of our expressions depends on the use we give them. This is also 
why he has been read as a conventionalist about mathematics and why it is difficult to make 
sense of what, if anything, he defines as mathematical objectivity. One way to breach a trail is 
by being clear on how Wittgenstein characterises linguistic usage. In the following I will 
attempt to trace this in the briefest way possible. 
 First, Wittgenstein explains language use, then how such use is embedded in our form 
of life, and finally how our form of life sustains mathematical objectivity, that is, that the 
objectivity of proofs is ultimately answerable to regulated actions. Wittgenstein remarks that 
as children we begin to acquire language through very simple practices, at times very much 
like two builders who only use a couple of words to designate construction materials. One 
yells 'brick' and the other brings a brick to him. So we learn that some words designate certain 
objects, and we begin to correlate them, identify their distinctive features, learn their relevant 
synonyms, and so develop new possibilities of expressing statements. Now, this describes a 
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part of language very well but, Wittgenstein goes on to say, there is a great variety of 
language-games within language, some more simple, some more complex, that we can 
construct for different purposes. It is through engaging in these games that we learn to master 
a language. Bringing up the image of a game shows an intuitively accurate process of the 
interactions needed in learning to use language. We learn language in a similar way we learn 
to play a game. We start off without knowing how to play, we see others do it. As in a game, 
people's linguistic interactions are sanctioned by communal accords, say like when we agree 
that we are playing one game and not another, when we agree that we have started and 
when we finish, when someone wins and when someone makes an invalid move. These 
practices make us understand that there is a right and a wrong way to follow instructions. 
What confers meaning to expressions and what ultimately makes the multiple language-
games work and interconnect is the form of life where they are embedded and used. The 
meanings of 'agreement', 'rule' and 'same' are intertwined (PI §§ 224-225), and agreement 
and rule-following can only take place within a community where the use of expressions is 
publicly prescribed and sanctioned. 'One does not learn to obey a rule by first learning the use 
of the word "agreement". Rather, one learns the meaning of "agreement" by learning to follow 
a rule [i.e. the rules that govern the use of the term 'agreement']. If you want to understand 
what it means to "follow a rule", you have already to be able to follow a rule' (RFM VII §39), 
since to be able to achieve any understanding at all, we must be able to follow explanations, 
discern their scope, we must be trained in reading and learning patterns and in discerning 
correct ways of performing these from incorrect ones. In this sense, proceeding in accordance 
to a rule is founded on, or presupposes, agreement (RFM VII §26). Now, there is obviously a 
problem with explaining what it is to follow a rule by saying that one already knows how to 
follow a rule. We may say that to be able to follow a rule is perhaps a prerequisite for 
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knowledge, but Wittgenstein's particular observations still need to be spelled out more clearly. 
 Wittgenstein admits it is difficult to avoid redundancies when defining rule-following, but 
also remarks that we have to accept that our language works within a framework of 
agreements, and it is hard to account for them without already mentioning them: this is the 
extent to which language depends on agreements and regularities of the use of expressions. 
'The application of the concept "following a rule" presupposes a custom. Hence it would be 
nonsense to say: just once in the history of the world someone followed a rule (or a signpost; 
played a game, uttered a sentence, or understood one; and so on).' (RFM VI §21) 
 Now, communal agreement does not determine the facts that constitute the world, but 
it is crucial that we agree on what we call 'fact' and 'true' to learn what does. It is not a trivial 
demand to ask that we must have a common criterion to find out if some sentence is true or 
false. We know that, usually, most of our sentences must refer to some fact and that we need 
to be able to check, in some way, if such fact obtains, make sure we are not being deceived, 
etc. In other words, we have learned to use the concept 'truth', to call some things possibly 
true and understand that others cannot be true. This agreement happens within the language 
we use, it is brought about by the very use of language: it is not an arbitrary agreement of 
opinions, but an agreement in form of life (PI §241). This point needs to be discussed 
because such agreement in form of life will provide the objective criteria for the correctness of 
mathematical results. The reasoning goes something like this: it is quite independent from us 
that, say, 2 + 2 = 4 (PI II xi, p. 226), such operation is actually an objective feature of our 
calculus. Yet this is a calculus which is made possible because of standards of correctness 
and certainty that stem from our form of life. Being in common accord is necessary to follow 
derivations properly. The objection Wittgenstein wants to block is the question 'if everyone 
believed that 2 + 2 = 5, would 2 + 2 = 4 remain the correct operation?' Wittgenstein 
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challenges our imagination: it is not at all trivial that we can imagine the conditional, that we 
can make sense of everyone believing that 2 + 2 = 5, for this is not just a belief, it touches 
upon practice. An addition is not a fact of experience because, by the rules that govern it, it 
can't be otherwise. That is what a rule is, an unquestionable procedure by which we build all 
judging (RFM VI §28), all questioning and inferring hinges on it. People believed for a long 
time that the Earth was the centre of our solar system, then they were proved wrong. Yet, 
there was nothing unimaginable about it, nothing that would lead to logical contradiction. It 
was simply an imaginable, possible fact that did not obtain. We cannot judge the 'possibility' 
that '2 + 2 = 5' in a similar fashion, for the statement runs against the rules of logic and 
mathematics. The implications of such hypothetical widespread belief turn on themselves, to 
add 2 + 2 = 5 would entail an unsustainable, inoperable mathematics. It is not the case that 
we would have a mathematics just as ours, except for that 'minor' change, there would be no 
mathematics at all. 
 A good analogy to better understand Wittgenstein's concepts of rules and rule-following 
considers comparing the model of a machine, which describes how the machine works and 
moves, with an actual machine built under such model's guidelines. Trained as an engineer, 
Wittgenstein is more than aware that a machine's parts become worn out, some more quickly 
than others, that the machine is susceptible to temperature changes, friction, etc. (RFM I 
§122) Just as we need to see the machine operating to fully understand what it does and how 
it does it, we need to analyse language in practice, as an activity, surrounded by empirical 
contingencies, yet logically, internally, determined to do certain operations. To work out how a 
mechanism will operate is similar to working out a multiplication rule: the outcome is 
normatively determined, but is not, as it were, already present. Saying that the machine's 
action seems to be in it from the start is like saying that the future movements of a machine 
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are like objects which are already lying in a drawer and which we then take out (íbid.). A 
similar claim is made about mathematical formulae, like the rule for the expansion of π for 
instance, as if the numbers in the expansion existed and, say, we could check if the pattern 
'7777' is part of those numbers or not. 
 The philosophical point of this analogy with a machine is that mathematical laws 
determine possibilities for action just as a diagram or description of how a mechanism 
functions determine the actual workings of a machine. There are empirical constraints, no 
doubt, on the construction of the actual machine as well as on the development of the 
mathematical techniques we have, and though we cannot foresee how the machine will 
actually, in detail, work, we can perfectly well picture the movement the machine is supposed 
to have. The actual movement will undoubtedly be very similar. Such movement is 
determined, in a sense, we see it in the dotted lines and arrows, we can understand how it will 
proceed. We understand that a machine is, for instance, making a rotating movement even if 
the actual rotations vary because, say, some piece spins around more loosely or tighter than 
it seemed in the diagram, etc. But even if different people model the machine and build it with 
different materials, the outcome remains basically the same (PI §194). We can understand it 
so well we can figure out unforeseen possible applications for it before building it, or ways in 
which it could improve. The possibility of a machine's movement thus stands in a unique 
relation to the movement itself, closer than that of a picture with its subject. We can say that 
the empirical world, experience, will determine whether some drawing of Cologne's Cathedral 
really pictures the actual cathedral. Yet it is not an empirical fact that a machine has precisely 
a certain possibility of movement (íbid.). The possibility Wittgenstein is talking about here is 
different from the empirical conditions of the movement. This suggests that he refers to a 
necessity beyond the empirical constraints of the machine, something closer to the order or 
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logic that governs the movement, beyond laws of friction or gravity. This is the idea behind 
arguing that mathematical statements are not quite accurately described as contentful or 
truth-apt, for, similarly, we can argue that there is no fact or set of facts that could picture what 
mathematical statements establish, that is, nothing that could depict the character which 
makes them norms that dictate possibilities of understanding, rather than ultra-general, 
abstract truths which talk about abstract objects and entities of the sort. 
 When Wittgenstein argues that the correctness of mathematical operations depends on 
our constant, regular practice, he does not say that mathematics depends on whatever we do 
that reflects our mood or intentions at the time, but rather that we participate in a practice that 
has set specific rules for formulas, standards for their correct use, sanctions to diverging 
results, etc. In RFM I §34 he explains that the final argument against someone who refuses to 
follow a proof that has been derived correctly or to accept a correct result is just to remark 
'This is how it goes, can't you see? Look!' and, rightly acknowledged, he adds that that is not 
an argument. This first seems unhelpful. It seems to point out that we must follow the 
instruction fully and blindly because that is the way we do it, thus begging the question. But 
on a closer reading we see there is supporting evidence for Wittgenstein's case. It is true 
enough that mathematical techniques have proved to pay, that they are effective tools, yet this 
is not what justifies them. Like a game, for which there may be a cause of its being played, 
mathematics may be used because it has powerful, effective tools that pay off. This may be, 
causally, why we keep employing mathematical techniques, but this does not have to be its 
ground (OC §474), its justification or the reason why it works, what makes mathematics 
normative, in a word. Wittgenstein makes the following distinction: on the one hand we have 
empirical facts that indeed play a causal part in constituting our language, determining how 
words and discourses take shape, as well as why language looks, sounds and works the way 
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it does. Empirical characteristics of language, for instance the phonetics and syntax of actual 
languages in the XXI century, are not what grounds linguistic necessity, but they are needed 
for regularities to develop within certain limits, to become salient to us, for us to become 
accustomed to them and make them standards of measuring, counting, grouping, etc. On the 
other hand we have the normative dimension of these characteristics, the fact that they 
constrain the way we think and act, like a machine's constitution. Though parts can be added 
or removed, there is a movement limitation established by the way the machine is built. 
 Practising mathematicians like Philip Davis and Reuben Hersh acknowledge that 
mathematicians have only one way to prove the meaning of theorems to sceptical outsiders: 
by introducing the latter to their way of thinking. If a sceptical student manages to absorb their 
way of thinking then they are no longer critical outsiders. If they don't understand it, then they 
get 'flunked out'. If they get it and still think that the mathematical arguments are wrong, then 
they are simply dismissed as misfits (The Mathematical Experience, 1981, p. 44; quoted in 
Tymoczko, 1984, p. 463). Similarly, we can only understand and inquire into the meaning of 
mathematical proofs assuming there is a background community of users of proof-
expressions. A community provides institutions, structures and training that sanction our 
mathematical operations. Now, we may be taken aback at a first glance with this sort of 
explanation. As Tymoczko points out, it is easy to think that communities of mathematicians 
come second to well-established mathematical knowledge, which an individual may obtain in 
isolation. It makes sense to think that the obtaining of mathematical knowledge is prior to its 
distribution or communication via communities (1984, p. 449). Being set in a community does 
not seem essential to mathematics, or it may be a trivial requisite: we can end up saying that, 
for that matter, we need a community for research in every area of knowledge, so no real 
explanatory work is done here. Even if it is necessary to have a community to have 
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mathematics, it seems not to be a sufficient condition for mathematical objectivity. 
Communities may, after all, misconceive mathematical truths. But Wittgenstein reminds us 
that calculations are ratified by an agreement of ratifications (RFM VII §9). In practice, due to 
the complexity of the subject, mathematicians need to collaborate, compare results, even 
work together in large numbers to tackle a single problem. The role mathematics plays as a 
human activity is stressed once again by noting that there has to be understanding among the 
calculators to determine right and wrong results. 
 Usually, when we start philosophically analysing how mathematics works, we will be 
referred back to, and need to scrutinise, more and more basic, elementary, previously 
established logical principles on which our every-day sums and measurements, as well as 
higher mathematics, depend. But Wittgenstein points out that beyond these 'first principles' 
we need a starting point of agreement that transcends mathematical formalisation, or that 
does not appeal to logic as an underlying foundation. He argues this because it seems that to 
provide an answer about mathematics that calls upon formalisation is begging the question: 
one would already have to have bought a stance on how mathematics works to ask, with the 
vocabulary, concepts and tools of that stance, how mathematics works. The 'form of life' 
account that Wittgenstein develops aims to answer these lingering questions by analysing 
mathematical practice, how we learn and teach the concept of mathematical necessity, and 
inquiring into its origin in practice itself. 
 As Wittgenstein puts it, we cannot ignore that our form of life has made mathematical 
agreement possible in the first place, and note that such agreement has been carried further 
by the proofs (RFM IV §30). That is, proofs reinforce mathematical order, they derive new 
concepts that are rooted in the most basic agreements we share regarding space, time, 
proportion, equality, sameness, rhythm. For instance, in the above proof of the irrationality of 
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√2, we learn rules to operate in arithmetic, relations of proportion between even and odd 
numbers and their squares, as well as rules that govern the expansion of irrationals, which in 
turn form a part of the rules that structure the reals. We learn the certainty of this proof so that 
if we should find ourselves in the middle of deriving another apparently correct proof in 
number theory that, among other things, assumed that √2 or the square root of another prime 
was rational, and this was a pivotal assumption for the rest of the alleged proof to work, then 
we would rightly dismiss such chain of derivations. 
 Wittgenstein explains that a proof channels our experience (RFM IV §34), it directs our 
actions and thoughts. In this sense, he actually sides with Frege in arguing that mathematical 
laws apply not only to facts, but to anything we can intelligibly frame (Dummett, in Jacquette, 
2002, p. 20). Wittgenstein's position, thus, emphasises both the undeniable relation between 
mathematics and empirical reality, in that the former frames the latter, as well as the absolute 
necessity of mathematics. The insight we gain into a proof has repercussions in human action 
(RFM IV §32), this is why it affects our form of life. The concept that is formed guides our 
experience into particular channels (RFM IV §33), and so makes us see necessary 
connexions, between shapes and numbers, for example, or between different equations, 
which will together encompass our view of necessary mathematical relations that impinge 
upon the ways we conceive the world. In following a rule, continuing a mathematical series for 
instance, the transformation we produce is a kind of establishment of an identity (RFM VI §29). 
For example, by learning how to operate with irrational numbers, we understand their 
meaning, their place, their different character in regards to the natural numbers, the different 
kind of proportion or quantity they compass in comparison to the integers, etc. 
 Mathematics defines the possibilities of thought, the modes of description of actual and 
possible phenomena, as well as the methods of discovery of truths, indeed everything we can 
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think and do. Mathematics teaches 'not just the answer to a question, but a whole language-
game with questions and answers.' (RFM VII §18) Instead of learning new facts with 
mathematics, we learn to identify, give identity to, forms of facts. We define a play in billiards 
with trigonometry, the growth of a plant with integral calculus, and so on. 
 Relative to mathematics, physical theories are more open to revision. If we discover, 
say, an elementary particle that does not behave as it should, then we do not just ignore it 
exists and let it accommodate on its own, we have to account for it. Perhaps it will turn out 
that it is a particle we already knew, we just misplaced some data and thought it was a 
different one. But if our theory cannot explain it, then we will have to change it to 
accommodate the finding somehow. Granted, a similar thing can occur in mathematics. Say, 
we derive an odd consequence in a proof, an affirmation that does not fit with the rest of the 
statements or which would imply some breach of a law of inference. The relevant difference is 
that in mathematics we are not just talking about an anomaly, but rather something that 
indeed challenges our mathematical conceptions, our very way of thinking. An unsuspected 
finding in a theory in physics could, most of the time, still be explained with the existing 
scientific tools. Of course, scientific revolutions do occur, but they are called that way 
precisely because they become a watershed in the way science is done, and they 
presuppose that there are long periods of stable science practice. A contradicting statement in 
mathematics, however, directly challenges the very tools we are using. That is, if in a logical 
derivation we derive both p and ¬p then, distractions and typos excluded, there must be a 
mistake in it, and we refuse to think along its guidelines, or to be more precise, we find out we 
simply cannot think that way. A mathematical proposition, like a proven mathematical 
statement, is not just an object of knowledge, but something that 'shapes our behaviour' 
(Avigad, 2008, p. 329), that changes what we think conceivable, and even what we can do. In 
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practice this means we abandon techniques that lead us to contradiction, dismiss them as 
useless, whereas physical theories with conflicting results deserve our attention until one of 
them is falsified. 
 In a public form of life, different mathematical proof-techniques take their shape, they 
extend, combine and transform. We get used to the uniformity of their results. These active 
practices, our ways of engaging with the world, change with a mathematical change. A proof 
does precisely this, it makes us see mathematics in a new light. It does not discover a 
mathematical entity or depict a matter of fact, it creates concepts to regulate our forms of 
expression. A proof can, for example, connect techniques, like those in algebra with those in 
geometry to define a two-dimensional sphere in a three-dimensional Euclidean space; or it 
can introduce the concept of elliptic curves to provide a fundamental aid in the proof of 
Fermat's Last Theorem, which is itself a problem in number theory. These connexions, which 
are not accumulations of truths but rather conceptual adjustments, constitute mathematical 
progress. 
 Going back to the concept of form of life, we can sum up  that Wittgenstein uses it to 
explain, in a very simple and uncontentious way of putting it, that if there were not complete 
agreement among calculating agents, mathematicians, mathematics teachers, we would not 
learn any mathematical technique. Indeed, there would be no mathematics at all, for 
mathematics originates and develops as a practice. This does not mean, however, that global 
agreement is sufficient to do correct mathematics, it only points out that agreement is needed, 
and that such requisite should not be overlooked. 
 
1.2.2 Conceptual changes 
As mathematical techniques develop, they in turn change the way we deal with the world, 
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they enrich our understanding, we find more and more applications for them. This kind of 
progress, Wittgenstein argues, must be understood as a conceptual change. Let us look at an 
example, say, the law of associativity. When we learn it, we slightly change our concept of 
addition and multiplication, namely because they now have to adjust them to the law. Now we 
have to incorporate what the law dictates to all sums and multiplications. Now we can read 
long strings of numbers as we group them out associatively in our sums and multiplications. 
In a way, the road we can travel with addition and multiplication has been expanded into new 
directions, and even some shortcuts have been set, because we can make these 
combinations. Mathematics forms concepts that help us comprehend things, to deal with 
situations (RFM VII §67), it gives us geometrical explanations to understand our location, to 
build structures; it gives us a sense of infinity, of duality, of negation, which we use daily. 
 The formation of a concept, let us recall, guides our experience into defined, particular 
channels, to see experiences in a new way. Just like 'an optical instrument makes light come 
from various sources in a particular way to form a pattern.' (RFM IV §33) The instrument here 
is the proof, the pattern of light is the proved proposition. Some mathematical proofs, as 
explained above, lead us to say that actually we cannot imagine something we thought we 
had clearly imagined, which leads us to 'revise what counts as the domain of the imaginable' 
(PI §517). For example we learn that, unlike in Euclidean geometry, in hyperbolic geometry 
the parallel postulate2 does not hold; or, as another example, we can prove the impossibility 
of constructing a heptagon with ruler and compass. But in non-Euclidean geometries we do 
not discover new spaces, it is more accurate to say we regard space in a new way. When I 
figure out what a proof is saying, and I figure out that this must be so, I am making something 
                                                 
2 The parallel postulate establishes that for any straight line and a point not on it, there exists only one straight 
line which passes through that point and never intersects the first line. In other words, the two lines described 
can be extended to any length and would not intersect. 
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into the criterion of identity (RFM IV §29). This is why we decree, for example, 'we will now 
operate with hyperbolic geometry', we will take into account certain curves and other features 
we did not cover when we worked with Euclidean space. We see our mathematical tools 
differently thanks to the new geometrical concepts. 
 To sum up, Wittgenstein defines mathematical development or progress as a 
conceptual change based on two reasons. First, as we have seen in the definition of form of 
life, mathematics is an activity. Our form of life and the mathematics that develops with it are 
not fixed, but dynamic; likewise, one is not the basis for the other, they are rather 
interconnected, arise together. A proof transforms the activities we can perform, so we may 
learn to do more things with curves, plot different surfaces, and this does not mean that those 
curves and surfaces are newly discovered features of mathematical geography, but that we 
now know more about curves and space, and we can picture and use them in a wider range 
of situations. The key idea is that it is in the course of deriving a mathematical proof, i.e. in the 
process of drawing inferences and establishing connexions, understanding more fully what 
the research is about, as well as its consequences and potential for even more future 
research, that we learn to see mathematics in new ways. Why cannot we just say we discover 
more mathematics? Presumably, Wittgenstein would argue, because a mathematical change 
does not, strictly speaking, add knowledge. It is rather a command or instruction that directs 
our perception, instead of being guided by it. A new mathematical concept introduces a new 
paradigm among the paradigms of the language, 'the proof changes the grammar of our 
language, changes our concepts. It makes new connexions, and it creates the concept of 
these connexions. (It does not establish that they are there; they do not exist until it makes 
them.)' (RFM III §31) 
 Secondly, the reason why it is accurate to define mathematical proofs as conceptual 
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changes and, at the same time, the reason to define a proven statement as necessary, is 
neatly expressed in the following clarification: Wittgenstein notes that when someone says 'If 
you follow the rule you must get this result', the person that gives the instruction has not any 
clear concept of what the experience would correspond to the opposite (RFM IV § 29). Here 
he highlights his long-held view that genuine (factual) propositions and the truth-falsity 
dichotomy belong together. A proposition, he seems to conclude, is truth-apt iff it depicts a 
possible state of affairs. But truth-false bivalence does not apply in mathematics. We need to 
regard mathematical statements as concepts because they dictate how we are to operate, 
how to calculate, and it is unintelligible that we should calculate any other way. A wrong 
addition is not a false addition, it is just not addition at all, it is not mathematics at all. 
Mathematical knowledge differs from scientific knowledge in that respect. If we understand 
the necessary character of mathematical proofs in their full rigour then, in the case of a 
conjecture or an open mathematical question, we really cannot say that their proofs are out 
there, regardless of our arriving at them. 'It must be like this, does not mean: it will be like this. 
On the contrary: "it will be like this" chooses between one possibility and another. "It must be 
like his" sees only one possibility.' (RFM IV §31) It is only when we understand this one and 
only possibility, when we spell it out and realise what are its full implications, i.e. when we 
construct its proof or disproof, that we have a proper piece of mathematical knowledge. 
 
1.3 Wittgenstein's critics: on the objectivity of proofs 
By now it should be fairly obvious that Wittgenstein's stance, his overall conceptual framework 
and research questions are not, by any means, uncontroversial. Michael Dummett and 
Crispin Wright are two of the most incisive critics of the philosophical ideas expounded above, 
and two of the most clearly focused on attacking what they consider Wittgenstein's dubious 
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view of mathematical objectivity. Since our present goal is to understand the philosophical 
meaning of mathematical proofs, we need to determine if Wittgenstein's views provide a 
satisfactory account of how proofs are objectively established. 
 
1.3.1 Dummett on Wittgenstein's conventionalism 
Dummett believes Wittgenstein's goal is to demonstrate that platonism tells a wrong account 
of mathematics, and a radical kind of constructivism tells the correct story. To clarify, for 
constructivism in general, Dummett reminds us, it is not the notions of truth and falsity which 
are central to determine the sense of mathematical statements, but rather the notion of proof, 
and the conditions under which we regard ourselves as justified in asserting a statement, i.e. 
when we are in possession of a method leading to the statement's proof (1959, p. 325). But, 
once again, Wittgenstein's views seem to be at the extreme. For even if we embraced 
constructivism and even if, with Wittgenstein, we could reject the idea that a mathematical 
statement is determinately either true or false, still, under a form of constructivism, we would 
still have no choice but to follow a proof and accept it as necessary upon constructing it 
(Dummett, 1959, p. 332), that is, because the proof imposes itself on us once it is constructed. 
Dummett considers Wittgenstein does not accept the latter claim, and so subscribes him to a 
'full-blooded' constructivism, at the extreme of the constructivist spectrum, where the logical 
necessity of any statement is always the direct expression of a linguistic convention, of our 
choosing to treat it as necessary and unassailable (1959, p. 329), as it were, 'on the spot'. 
 Dummett affirms that Wittgenstein does not offer distinguishable criteria for accepting 
or rejecting a proof. He reads Wittgenstein's views as affirming that if we accept a proof then 
we have automatically conferred necessity on it, and since ‘there is nothing in our formulation 
of the axioms and of the rules of inference, and nothing in our minds when we accepted these 
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before the proof was given, which of itself shows whether we shall accept the proof or not' he 
concludes that in Wittgenstein's rule-following account 'there is nothing which forces us to 
accept the proof.’ (1959, p. 330) For Dummett, Wittgenstein's metaphor of placing a theorem 
'in the archives' of mathematical knowledge is quite literal, and an arbitrary and new decision, 
detached from our previous engagements with other theorems and the logical steps involved 
in the derivation. His characterisation of Wittgenstein's stance paints a primitive picture of 
mathematics in which we're always deciding what to count as new theorems, ignoring the 
rigorous, correct, effective formalisation that mathematics has undeniably achieved to a great 
extent already. 
Dummett seems to read Wittgenstein's remarks on the way we follow rules and 
perform mathematical practice as if such practice was limited to almost the proper physical 
actions of agents counting, proving, measuring, as well as teaching and learning to perform 
these activities. Evidence for such reductive view comes out in the way Dummett insists that 
the strict formalisation of arithmetic, the actual use of explicit formulations of rules with Arabic 
numbers and precise wordings of rules must warrant the correct application of rules (1959, p. 
331), regardless of an agent's intentions, confusions or finite mind. Wittgenstein's account 
allegedly ignores all these formal elements and comes down to affirm that our recognition of 
logical necessity should become 'a particular case of our knowledge of our own intentions' 
(Dummett, 1959, p. 328), which of course is irrelevant to an account of the necessity of 
mathematical proofs. 
To illustrate his point against Wittgenstein's radical position in rather basic terms, 
Dummett reminds us that if we count 5 boys and 7 girls in a room, and then proceed to count 
all the children and get 13, we would conclude we have made a mistake in our counting. This 
is of course because we add our first two counts and find the result discrepant with the third 
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count. Now, Dummett thinks Wittgenstein would explain our conclusion, that we have 
miscounted, rather by saying that we choose to adopt a new criterion for saying there are 12 
children, which is different from the criterion of counting them all together, i.e. we now choose 
to add our boy-count to our girl-count instead of counting all the children. So when we use 
different calculating techniques (i.e. adding vs. counting) it seems we can get different, 
apparently equally valid results. 
Dummett phrases it this way: if we have two criteria for the same statement, they may 
clash, but the necessity of operations such as ‘5 + 7 = 12’ consists precisely in that nothing 
clashes in our procedures (1959, p. 329). If all we have is a disconnected group of techniques, 
as Wittgenstein wants to say according to Dummett, then with our counting technique alone 
miscounts will often go undetected, hiding errors that are there and that our adding technique 
is ready to denounce. Our adding technique will point out something that the counting 
technique could not encompass, which seems to leave the truth of the statement ‘5 + 7 = 12’ 
somehow undecided and dependent on different criteria. 
In learning a new criterion for miscounting, thanks to the incorporation of the adding 
technique to their mathematical skills, a person learns to objectify a symptom of their 
miscounting (Dummett, 1959, p. 334), they get a hint of evidence of a truth they missed. The 
person comes to understand that it cannot possibly be the case that whenever there are 5 
boys and 7 girls in a room there are 13 children altogether. They would now know that that is 
utterly false because 5 + 7 = 12. But, Dummett presses on, this person’s acquirement of a 
new technique is not what makes their first miscounting necessarily false. Their first mistake, 
albeit undetected, was necessarily a miscount already. When we make a mathematical 
mistake, we must always make a sort of mistake, a particular mistake (íbid.), not one we 
could only conceive of after we acquire some technique. 
41 
 
Dummett’s verdict is that ‘Wittgenstein’s main reason for denying the objectivity of 
mathematical truth is his denial of the objectivity of proof in mathematics' (1959, p. 346) and 
the latter is really the target of Dummett's criticism. For him, Wittgenstein believes 'a proof 
does not compel acceptance; and what fits this conception is obviously the picture of our 
constructing mathematics as we go along’ (íbid.) as if we remained ever free to decide on a 
proof's correctness. Now, Dummett’s paper in the end accepts that a good proof imposes 
itself upon us. Once we have accepted the proof, if we should later reject it this would be a 
criterion for determining we have not understood the terms in which it is expressed, and 
moreover no one could reject it without saying something which would have been recognised 
before the proof was given as going back on what they had previously agreed to, i.e. falling 
into logical contradiction, much like what was explained in the reductio example above on the 
proof of the irrationality of √2. Since Dummett interprets Wittgenstein as always allowing 
these retractions, or considering them harmless, he cannot let him have a solid account of 
mathematical objectivity and necessity. 
Finally, and very importantly, Dummett highlights the difficulty of making sense of 
Wittgenstein's central claim that a mathematical proof is a conceptual change. We must admit 
that it is hard to accept the stance. Particularly, how could a proof bring about any progress in 
mathematics as a conceptual change? It seems we must either adopt the conceptual 
modification that the proof advances, and with that have all of our mathematics transform, and 
thereby have it not growing but rather modifying altogether (which is implausible enough); or, 
by rejecting the conceptual change, we would keep the mathematics we had, and no real 
progress would occur, things would stay the same. It looks as if either way there is not a 
proper growth of knowledge if we consider a proof a conceptual change. As Dummett notes, 
'[f]or Wittgenstein, accepting [a] theorem is adopting a new rule of language, and hence our 
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concepts cannot remain unchanged at the end of the proof. But we could have rejected the 
proof without doing any more violence to our concepts than is done by accepting it; in 
rejecting it we could have remained equally faithful to the concepts with which we started out.' 
(1959, p. 333) To spell this out properly, Wittgenstein allegedly considers that with a new proof 
mathematics does not grow, but changes, and it changes because we decide, without 
necessarily sticking to our rules of logical inference, to endow some arbitrary propositions with 
logical necessity. Even if we would come upon a theorem that is perfectly correctly derivable 
in a strong formal system in mathematics, Wittgenstein still would see it a viable option to 
adopt it or reject it, again, 'on the spot', once constructed. Now, it is fair to say that no fact of 
the matter binds us to follow a rule, that a rule does not correspond to any reality, Dummett 
continues, but we can remain critics of platonism and still accept that the force of the proof 
comes not from our recognition of it, but from a strict formalisation that is always available for 
us to check and which we are able to follow. This is his more moderate constructivist position 
coming to the fore, a view that sympathises with a critique of mathematical truth-conditions 
yet finds an alternative location for mathematical necessity in the compulsion we must feel 
when and if we formulate the assertibility conditions to construct a determinate proof. 
Dummett remarks that the arbitrariness or downright lack of criteria for correctness in 
mathematics, the shunning away of formal systems available to check the correctness of a 
proof-derivation and the elusive notion of proofs as conceptual changes in Wittgenstein's 
account make a case for the latter to be completely incapable of supporting a cogent outlook 
on what makes mathematical proofs objective, what justifies them, constitutes them and 
constructs them.   
 
1.3.2 Wright on unsubstantial rule-following 
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Wright takes a different critical stance. He subscribes Wittgenstein to an anti-realist 
conception not only of mathematics but also of understanding in general. First, Wright claims 
that Wittgenstein's account fails to explain how we are able to recognise a proof as such 
(1980, p. 50). This he draws from reading Wittgenstein's rejection of a mathematical proof as 
an authentic discovery. It would seem that when we discover something, by definition, we 
come upon a fact we formerly ignored. Wittgenstein's hostility to the existence of 
mathematical facts and rejection of content (the 'aboutness' of mathematics or, more 
specifically, the truth-aptness of mathematical expressions) in mathematical statements 
makes this ordinary notion of discovery inapplicable in mathematics. For Wright, as we derive 
a proof, we must know what we are looking for, and we set out to find it in a well-defined 
formal system, with specific axioms and rules, following which will lead us to it. We will go 
through the steps of the proof and know that the result is what we had to arrive at. The proof, 
in short, will lead us to a truth we can recognise from the outset. The proof's job is only to get 
us there. If we do not know what we are looking for, Wright's reasoning goes, we cannot 
pursue it. Formal systems in mathematics, like number theory or Euclidean geometry, provide 
decidable notions of the identity of statements within the system, that is, identity of statements 
that indicate where we start from and where we end up when deriving a proof. This is made 
available through the syntactic criteria of the system in question. 
 'We do not need to know exactly what a proof of a particular statement will be like to know that we shall 
 recognise it if we see it; for the proof will be a consequence of the formulae of which the last is the 
 statement in question and of which every element is either an admissible assumption or derived from 
 such by specified rules of inference, correct application of each of which is an effectively decidable 
 matter.' (Wright, 1980, p. 51) 
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So, in a related objection, Wright asks, if we have such clearly defined standards of 
mathematical discovery, whence the room for Wittgenstein's argument that we arbitrarily 
decide what to count as a proof? There is clearly no decision to be made. We arrive at the 
correct answer, we do not fabricate it at will. 
 Wright's second main objection brings up Wittgenstein's opposition to mathematical 
realism. It's worth to take note that there is great appeal in the philosophical views informed 
by mathematical realism in general. Realism provides straightforward answers about the 
nature and constitution of facts and objects, like mathematical ones, or at the very least 
entertains the possibility of their existence without many qualms. So long as we can define 
our object like, say, 'an odd perfect number', and we know what odd numbers and perfect 
numbers are, the quest to find it or to report that it does not exist is a substantial, valid one. 
With our limited, finite capacities, the fact that we do not know and might never know if there 
is an odd perfect number, a proof or disproof of its existence plays the role of an auxiliary 
method of investigation, an indirect access to mathematical truths. Wright gives an example 
of this view regarding the mathematical properties of the series of natural numbers. He affirms 
that open mathematical questions, like, say, Goldbach's Conjecture (henceforth GC), are not 
only perfectly intelligible but also, if proven, would be both an authentic discovery and an 
establishment of an objective feature of number theory (Wright, 1990, p. 82). GC states 
 
All positive even integers ≥ 4 can be expressed as the sum of two primes 
 
For Wright, open mathematical questions like these definitely have a solution, we just have 
not been able to craft them yet. Likewise, a rigorously defined structure such as the series of 
natural numbers has no room for indeterminacies: the correct mathematical answers to open 
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questions are determined, built into the identity of the mathematical facts and objects (1990, p. 
83). Wright asks: 'how can the question whether all items of a certain kind have certain 
characteristic fail to have a determinate answer -even if we cannot know what the answer is- 
if the items in question are a sharply defined class and the characteristic in question is 
something which each of them determinately possesses or not?' (1990, p. 81) For instance, 
we know what even numbers are, so we could say we know the characteristics of all even 
numbers, and that they determinately have the property of being the sum of 2 primes or not. 
Thus, Wright affirms, contrary to what Wittgenstein argues and also drawing distance from 
Dummett, proofs have a sort of secondary role to play in mathematical research: they are 
means to get to ends, the ends being the mathematical truths themselves. 
 Wright confronts this against Wittgenstein's thought that our conceptual structures are 
not autonomous, that they are part of human practices and would not exist without us. For 
Wright that is enough to conclude that in Wittgenstein's view there is no external compulsion, 
no normative constraints upon us to ratify a proof. Wright thus defends the idea that we 
explore, rather than form, conceptual structures in mathematics (1980, p. 48). 
 Thirdly and with wider implications, Wright questions Wittgenstein's rejection of 
mathematical content also from another angle: he asks why we should have so many 
reservations about accepting that conjectures in mathematics have a clear content, although 
their truth has not been established, when elsewhere, like in the generalisations of natural 
science, we accept that scientific hypotheses indeed have content, without much objection 
(1980, p. 19). In other words, he asks why we accept so naturally that there is definitely an 
answer about whether, say, element x can or cannot be found in planet b, and that we just 
don't know it yet, (but perhaps in a near future we will send a scientific mission to go and find 
out); and yet we deny that the GC definitely refers to something, deny that there are two, and 
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only two, possible outcomes for it, either it is true or it is false, and we just don't know which 
one it is until either of the two proofs is articulated. If we cannot provide a satisfactory 
justification for the reason why we treat mathematical statements differently from empirical 
statements which are difficult to verify, that is, if we cannot justify why we treat some 
statements whose truth remains to be established as truth-apt and others as non-truth-apt, 
then we cannot arbitrarily deny that mathematical statements have a definite content. 
 Wright has a point. For how would we possibly understand the open question in the GC 
if we could not imagine it being true? How could I even write about it here? We don't need to 
wait for a conceptual change that accommodates the result in number theory, we already 
know, at least in a rough way, how either answer would look like. This objection will be more 
thoroughly addressed in Wittgenstein's distinction between proofs and experiments in the next 
chapter, but at this point it is enough to understand Wright's claim that mathematical problems 
are not solved by changing our conception of them, but that they are genuinely open 
questions that are answered through mathematical research, through obtaining more 
knowledge, and that once obtained, they will be genuine discoveries, analogous to those in 
physical sciences. 
 Wright reads, as Dummett also does, that Wittgenstein rejects any predetermination of 
the correct application of a mathematical concept, even if a proof 'is a mechanically decidable 
notion, that is, that we may programme a machine effectively to check any putative proof, [for 
Wittgenstein] there is somehow in reality no rigid, advance determination of those sentences 
which are theorems.' (1980, p. 21) In this sense he objects against Wittgenstein's comparison 
of mathematics to games like chess, against his highlighting only the practical nature of 
mathematics and the apparent flexibility of its rules, which ultimately makes them lack logical 
compulsion and determination. The alleged game of mathematics, Wright would argue, 
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depends significantly more on its formulation and rigour, not just on however we happen to 
learn and practice mathematics. 
Drawing again some distance from Dummett, Wright also challenges intuitionistic or 
constructivist arguments, suggesting that some of Wittgenstein's arguments fit into that spirit, 
and claiming that the knowledge of the assertability conditions of unresolved mathematical 
statements cannot retain the classical view that mathematical proofs are binding and 
compelling (1980, p. 56). In other words, just knowing which deductive road to take to prove a 
statement does not do justice to the proof's logical necessity. For example, in Peano 
Arithmetic, the axioms and rules not only give us the correct line-up of steps in a proof of 
number theory, but also make us know when we've reached the desired theorem. Such 
identification is achieved syntactically. 
'[T]he view that understanding a sentence is knowing the conditions of objective truth of what it 
 expresses gives us some purchase on the identity of the mathematical statement independent of 
 knowing when it would be proved. But on an anti-realist conception [...] the strategy of attempting to 
 explain the proof-conditions of a statement by appealing to the idea of a valid chain of inferences 
 culminating in the statement in question, falls foul of the fact that only to someone who is already aware 
 of its proof-conditions is the identity of the desired conclusion intelligible.' (Wright, 1980, p. 52) 
So within an anti-realist framework, knowing the proof-, or assertability-, conditions of a 
statement is not only insufficient to guarantee a correct definition of the identity of the proof, 
but these conditions are also impossible to foresee, unless we already had the proof, which is 
exactly what we are after. Wright accepts that we cannot foresee the techniques that might be 
used to, say, derive a proof of GC, but any technique, we can rest assured, will be 
answerable to previously accepted criteria (1980, p. 53), that is, it will conform to accepted 
axioms and rules. Again, calculating techniques by themselves are just our means of getting 
to prove the truth of mathematical statements. 
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Wright thoroughly explores Wittgenstein's rule-following account, and there is not 
enough space here to comment on his criticism. However, it is worth to pay attention, at least 
briefly, to his remarks on the lack of content in rules. For Wittgenstein, let us keep in mind, 
mathematical rules are less like informative, declarative, factual propositions and more like 
laws or imperatives. Still, as we have explained above, rules grow and change, are dynamic 
and do not seem to determine an expression's meaning 'once and for all'. Wright explains that 
this is an inaccurate account of mathematics, for we give a predicate like 'is the sum of 2 
primes' a certain meaning by associating with it a certain criterion of application, which is 
determined in turn by the simpler expressions in it, like 'sum' and 'prime number'. So, he asks, 
how can there be any latitude, any indeterminacy regarding the application of such predicate? 
And he answers that, for Wittgenstein, such indeterminacy is due to the fact that he rejects 
that it is ever pre-determinate what counts as 'doing the same thing again' or 'applying a rule 
in the same way' (1980, p. 20), which, as the reader can probably tell at this point, will have 
major consequences not only in mathematics but in language and knowledge in general. 
Wright argues that understanding a rule, say, the rule of the expansion of an irrational number, 
must determine in advance what the nth place of the expansion should be (íbid.). This is 
telling of Wright's picture of mathematics, and why he thinks Wittgenstein's claims threaten 
'not merely [...] the objectivity of truth in mathematics, in the distinctively platonist sense, but 
indeed the whole picture of pure mathematics as something conceptually stable, as 
something in which the primary objective and substantial task is not conceptual innovation but 
the tracing of the liaisons and connexions between concepts to which we are already 
committed.' (íbid) If we follow Wittgenstein, Wright explains, we would end up accepting that 
there is no substance to the idea of an expression being used in accordance with its meaning 
(1980, p. 21). 
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The final blow is thrown against the idea that proofs produce, or are better understood 
as, conceptual changes. Wright contends that, if by accepting a proof we change the sense of 
its conclusion, as Wittgenstein seems to suggest, and if in the end we somehow end up with a 
different concept of the proof we were working on, then there is no room for the orthodox idea 
that we must be faithful to the concepts as they were before the proof was accepted (1980, p. 
41). But obviously we needed to conform to these concepts to carry out the task of proving in 
the first place, so are we now to turn our back on them? Are we not risking a self-imposed 
reductio here? For it seems as if the path that the open question created now turns back on 
itself. It changes, so we end up, in effect, with no question at all, no premisses, no 
intermediate steps, no conclusion, no proof. The intuitive idea is that we are able to recognise 
a proof because we understand the concepts involved in it and stick to their meaning. We 
keep, for example, uniform understandings of 'addition', 'prime number', etc. when we read 
and try to prove GC. How can accepting a conclusion change the conclusion, if we accept it 
precisely because it conforms to concepts we've been using constantly and consistently? And 
if the sense of the conclusion changes, 'then nothing in the way we understood it before can 
have required us to accept the proof; and similarly for our criteria for the correctness of the 
steps.' (íbid.) 
Wittgenstein's account comes down to affirming there are no substantial facts about 
the content of rules and about what complies with or breaches them, it simply makes no 
sense to talk about the content of a rule (Wright, 1990, pp. 91-92), but then we end up being 
unable to talk about rules at all. Wittgenstein does not concede that to follow a rule we need 
to keep track of something, stick to a commitment, whose correct application is clearly 
dictated independently of anyone's judgement. What's worse, Wittgenstein leaves us in the 
ruins of his critique and gives no positive alternative account. It seems we have to either 
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admit that rules have a determinate content and explain that this is why we agree in our 
performances according to them, or rules will just remain unaccounted for. 
Wright concludes that if we follow his reading of Wittgenstein as an anti-realist and 
believe there is no reality behind rules but rather that rules are somehow constitutionally 
responsive to our ongoing judgements and reactions, then we must accept that truth in 
general is constitutionally responsive in the same way, i.e. we can always justify our use of 
any rule. 
 
1.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has described some general philosophical questions surrounding the nature and 
the source of the necessity of mathematical proofs, briefly accounted for some of the major 
treatments and common lines of argument, and began to sketch Wittgenstein's position on the 
matter. It has acknowledged the latter's complexity and ambiguousness and admitted plenty 
of room for important critics to contribute to the discussion. This has served, nonetheless, to 
paint a more accurate picture of the scope and aims of Wittgenstein's remarks on proofs. 
Dialogue with his critics has helped to clarify philosophical claims on mathematical truth, what 
they amount to, which advantages and difficulties these claims present, as well as what 
issues alternative accounts would have to address. 
 We now turn to reply to such objections and examine if Wittgenstein's stance is 
defensible and philosophically relevant, particularly if it can provide us with a solid concept of 
mathematical objectivity, fundamental for a proper account of mathematical proofs. 
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Chapter II. Wittgenstein's account of the objectivity of mathematical proofs 
The previous chapter introduced Wittgenstein's philosophical views on mathematical 
statements, proofs and rule-governed mathematical practice. It presented his criticism against 
the view that mathematical proofs lead us to discover mathematical truths, as well as his 
claims that such way of framing philosophical research on proofs would do no justice to a 
sound definition of mathematical necessity. Instead it highlighted the relevance and 
explanatory role that notions like 'form of life' and 'conceptual change' could play in our 
understanding of proofs, that is, that the use of communal, rule-governed mathematical 
techniques and practices are inextricably linked to the ways we conceive and deal with 
empirical reality, and they stand in need for philosophical analyses as much as formal 
systems and axioms. Under this view, in summary, we regard mathematical statements as 
norms, law-givers by which we abide, and without which we could not think and act as we do. 
This will be part of Wittgenstein's wider philosophical outlook, namely that mathematical 
proofs transform mathematics, rather than discover mathematical truths. 
 These views have received strong criticisms, particularly from philosophers that 
consider a working notion of mathematical truth indispensable to account for mathematical 
statements and proven propositions. Such philosophers are also sceptical of how much 
explanatory power Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations have in the case of 
mathematics, and fear relativism and conventionalism sneak in. The chapter paid special 
attention to such critical reviews and exposed them thoroughly, emphasising the need to 
explain more clearly how we are to understand mathematical objectivity if we are to follow 
Wittgenstein's reasoning. The present chapter serves as a reply to such criticisms and as a 
defence of Wittgenstein's account of the objective correctness of mathematical proofs. In 
order to effectively reply to Dummett's and Wright's objections raised in the previous chapter, 
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and besides engaging directly with them, this chapter will also provide a more solid account of 
mathematical practice, which is crucial to define the correction criteria needed to establish 
mathematical objectivity in a way that accords with Wittgenstein's views. 
 Following, up to a point, an argument developed by Steiner (2009), this chapter will 
also describe and defend the role that the notion of ‘empirical regularities’ plays in 
Wittgenstein’s account of proofs. I will then argue why it is convenient to draw some critical 
distance from Steiner's conclusions. Finally, I put forward my own evaluation of Wittgenstein’s 
idea of how empirical regularities are ‘hardened’ into mathematical rules, so that the source of 
mathematical objectivity has a direct, yet non-causal, relation with the empirical world, and 
avoids ontological commitments to abstract objects and realms. These arguments will show 
that mathematical proofs can be conceived not as tools for mathematical discovery, but as 
norms that produce new understanding, new possibilities for mathematical practices to 
develop. 
 
2.1 Revisiting Wittgenstein's account 
Let us recall that the target of Wittgenstein's criticism is not only platonism or, for that matter, 
any specific epistemological position within philosophy of mathematics, but rather the lines of 
thought which affirm there is some sort of substance or content behind mathematical 
statements. These lines are directly tied to the idea that mathematical objectivity, though it 
may be in a sense, and only secondarily, related to human practice, is ultimately quite 
independent from it.  If Wittgenstein's account is to be successful, it must make a strong case 
that objectivity, practice and use in mathematics are more relevantly interconnected. 
 
2.1.1 Reply to Dummett 
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Wittgenstein does not affirm, as Dummett suggests (1959, p. 334), that a new mathematical 
technique gets its whole being anew, that we just decide to fabricate it and decide on its 
correctness, when to apply it and when to cease doing so. Borrowing Dummett's example of 
the agent that can count but not add and makes a miscount, suppose Connor can count but 
not add and Aldo has the same counting and adding abilities as we do. On one occasion 
Connor counts 5 boys and 7 girls in a room, and wanting to know how many children there 
are, he counts them all and comes up with a total of 13. Connor's limited ability makes it 
impossible for him to detect a mistake. He is good at counting, so if he could have noticed, for 
example, that he counted a boy twice, he would presumably count again, but he did not notice 
anything to make him doubt that particular time. When Aldo teaches him how to add, Connor 
comes to realise how absurd his statement ‘there are 5 boys, 7 girls, 13 children altogether 
here’ was. But back then, before acquiring the technique, he was conceptually blind to the 
rules of addition he needed for the miscount to be salient to him. He could not yet grasp what 
adding discrepancies were. So far he likely just placed objects together and gave each a 
number according to the order of the natural number series. 
Let us examine all the expressions involved here. We have, 
a) There are 5 boys 
b) There are 7 girls 
c) There are 12 children 
And we have the miscount that Connor gets, let's call it 
c') There are 13 children 
For Connor the relation a + b = c (or a, b, therefore c) is not immediately clear with his 
counting technique. So for him to affirm a, b and c' does not involve falling into contradiction. 
Now, even if I do not teach him yet how to add, I can order him 'Go to the drawer and bring 
54 
 
one lollipop for each child'. Remembering he counted 13 children, he will likely count and 
bring 13 lollipops and find out he has one left after all the children have already had their 
share, and this will presumably lead to his recount. But Dummett wants to press the point that 
the mistake is there regardless of Connor seeing it, either because he acknowledges it a 
second time around with his own counting technique, because I make him do an extra 
'exercise' in bringing the lollipops or because I teach him to add. The problem with such point 
is that it entails that what makes 5 + 7 = 12 is something like a feature of mathematical reality, 
so that when Connor says 'there are 5 boys, 7 girls, 13 children altogether here' he is uttering 
a falsehood, and that is the mistake. In Dummett's words, 
 'the effect of introducing [the person who can count but not add] to the concept of addition is not to be 
 simply described as persuading him to adopt a new criterion for having miscounted; rather, he has been 
 induced to recognize getting additively discordant results as a symptom of the presence of something he 
 already accepted as a criterion for having miscounted. That is, learning about addition leads him to say, 
 "I miscounted," in circumstances where he would not before have said it; but if, before he had learned, 
 he had said, "I miscounted," in those circumstances, he would have been right by the criteria he then 
 possessed.' (1959, p. 334) 
 Wittgenstein would explain the situation differently. For him mathematics forms 
concepts, concepts to deal with reality, and which condition our perceptions. Connor’s very 
limited criterion for a miscount allows him to say ‘There are 5 boys, 7 girls and 13 children 
altogether’, and equally allows him to correct his mistake should he notice it. But he is plainly 
not conceiving the wrong addition that his counts entail. And, since on this occasion nothing 
particular happened that would lead him to think he miscounted, since it is only from our 
criterion for adding correctly that we become aware of the miscount, and since he cannot add, 
then he does not have, as it were, the relevant mathematical structures and operations to 
betray and fall into contradiction. He simply does not grasp them. The reasoning goes, if he is 
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not playing a certain game, then he cannot make a foul move in such. 
 We could be tempted to say that Aldo has Connor’s criterion for miscounting, plus a 
complementary criterion given by the adding ability, but wouldn't it make more sense to say 
Aldo can no longer have Connor's limited technique, that we cannot put their counting abilities 
on a par? I say this because it seems Aldo cannot go back and not think of counting as, 
ultimately, working on a principle of accumulating (adding) units. If Aldo counted the boys in 
the room, getting a total of 5, and the girls in the room, getting a total of 7, he would probably 
not bother to count them all, for he can already work out '5 + 7 = 12'. Or, if he did count them 
all and got 13 as a total, he would likely judge that it is more probable that he got confused 
with all the children and ended up miscounting, rather than to have added two relatively small 
numbers and gotten the addition wrong. That is, he will stick to the criterion that the adding 
technique provides and judge it stronger than the counting one. It makes more sense to say 
that Aldo's arithmetical techniques changed, complementing each other and making him 
aware of a greater variety of situations. 
 To clarify, when Connor learns to add, he does not learn new truths, among which is 
the truth ‘5 + 7 = 12’, but perhaps something around the following lines: he learns that in 
counting he is grouping objects together, that here he has, let's say, a set of 5 kids, and here 
a set of other different 7 kids. Let's accompany Connor as he adds, let's make him scribble a 
stroke in a piece of paper for every boy he counts and surround all strokes in a circle, and 
then draw an asterisk for every girl he counts, and then encircle them as well. Then let's ask 
him to encircle both of these circles and see how many signs (strokes and asterisks) he has 
in total. Let's suppose he still thinks he got 13 children in total and he hasn't a clue what we're 
trying to show him. But then we ask him to count all the signs within the big circle, and being 
good at counting he will come up with 12. Now we can tell him that he actually just did with 
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strokes and asterisks what he did with boys and girls before. If he understands this and then 
we ask him how many children he thinks there are, he is entitled to be confused. Now we can 
explain him how we add, say, two small circles to make a big circle and get a grand total. 
Crudely put, if 5 is now understood as (I I I I I) and 7 as (* * * * * * *) and if he counts them all, 
Connor will see he must get 12 and cannot get 13. 
 Learning to see more fully the implications of a calculating technique can thus modify 
the way we conceive it. Both criteria, counting and adding, do not clash at all, as Dummett 
fears, that is why Connor can i) learn how to add, ii) make sense of his first miscount through 
his already mastered counting abilities, and iii) learn to trust his adding technique more than 
his counting technique, for it is shorter and more perspicuous, as his correlating elements to 
signs on paper shows. 
 Let's look at it this way: Aldo and I can see the mistake right away when Connor gives 
us his counting results. Connor cannot see it until he is aided by his counting technique and, 
without looking for it, without even suspecting a mistake, coerced by us, finds a fault in his 
procedure; or until he is trained in the adding technique. Otherwise he will be justified to 
report his counting results. Keeping in mind Wittgenstein's notion of form of life here, if 
Connor belonged to a community that only counted but did not add and he was particularly 
prone to count people twice, his community would see such mistake and correct or, maybe, 
re-train him to distinguish better between individuals. But that is all they can do in a form of 
life that does not include addition within its conceptual framework. We can say that there is a 
mistake and there is a miscount, but only from our form of life, with addition playing the 
fundamental role it plays in our lives. 
 In short, two mathematical techniques do not clash because they are not referring to 
two different, mutually contradictory facts. Rather, a new technique changes our way of 
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understanding, in this case by meshing with the old one. Together they provide new 
mathematical norms. In a way, we can argue against Dummett, we fully realise what counting 
amounts to when counting meshes with adding. If it is unclear that we can separate both, that 
is a fault in Dummett's example, and an argument in favour of Wittgenstein's definition of 
mathematics as a network of norms and a spectrum of techniques. After we learn to add, the 
mistake of a miscount is not the same anymore. We see it anew. We are ready to be 
scandalised at the thought of someone seriously thinking that 5 boys and (+) 7 girls together 
are (=) 13 children, but only because we have already mastered adding. The fact that our 
boy-count and our girl-count must yield a certain number when we add them up to make our 
children-count is not enforced by a mathematical state of affairs, but it is a consequence of 
framing a mathematical question in a specific way and answering it following specific 
mathematical rules, in this case we do it all through the technique of addition. This is why 
when we are asked 'how many children are there?' we know we are, in a way, being asked to 
add our boy-count to our girl-count, to provide a sum total. 
 Wittgenstein never says that different criteria have to oppose or cannot complement 
each other. Different criteria of correction for mathematical techniques do not contain different 
truths which may contradict each other, they rather set the norms that govern different 
mathematical processes. Connor's correction criteria for counting did not agree or disagree 
with Aldo's. Rules extend, rather than delete, the network of old rules (RFM I §166), so 
Connor's rules for counting are extended once he learns to add, in a similar way as the 
concept of irrational numbers is extended with the proof that √2 is irrational. Before going 
through it, perhaps we merely knew that irrationals expressed a different type of quantity, one 
that cannot be captured in the concept of 'integers' or 'rationals'. The proof, then, may also 
help us understand other numbers, like π, and how they are used to find approximate values 
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of measurements. 
 Wittgenstein questions if we should say we have discovered a new kind of calculation 
'if, having once learned to multiply, I am struck by multiplications with all the factors the same, as a 
 special branch of these calculations, and so I introduce the notation "an=..." [...] In exponentiation the 
 essential thing is evidently that we look at the number of the factors. But who says we ever attended to 
 the number of factors? It need not have struck us that there are products with 2, 3, 4 factors etc. 
 although we have often worked out such products[...] For what purpose do I use what has struck me? 
 -Well, first of all perhaps I put it down in a notation. Thus I write, e.g. "a2" instead of "a x a". By this 
 means I refer to the series of numbers (allude to it), which did not happen before. So I am surely setting 
 up a new connexion! -A connexion- between what objects? Between the technique of counting factors 
 and the technique of multiplying.' (RFM III §47, last emphasis mine). 
 
The point Wittgenstein stresses is that, ultimately, it is in practice that we understand 
the necessity of mathematical procedures, because in practice they allow us to form new 
concepts and understand reality in new ways. In practice they fully strike us as necessary. By 
practice Wittgenstein does not refer to some arcane notion of mathematical understanding or 
intuition, but quite simply to our standard mathematical training, how we learn to count, to 
factorise and build polygons, using concrete examples and then abstracting from them to 
frame new concepts, wider, unforeseen situations. 
Now what about the related criticism that Wittgenstein embraces a full-blooded 
conventionalism about mathematics? Dummett argues that one cannot make sense of the 
relation between an empirical regularity and the proof which induces us to ‘put it in the 
archives’. He writes that 
 ‘for Wittgenstein an empirical regularity lies behind a mathematical law. The mathematical law does not 
 assert that the regularity obtains, because we do not treat it as we treat an assertion of empirical fact, 
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 but as a necessary statement; all the same, what leads us to treat it in this way is the empirical 
 regularity, since it is only because the regularity obtains that the law has a useful application. What the 
 relation is between the regularity and the proof which induces us to put the law in the archives 
 Wittgenstein does not succeed in explaining.’ (1959, p. 341) 
 
Indeed this needs explanation. First, we must question if Wittgenstein really argues that 
mathematical objectivity depends on empirical laws in the way Dummett describes. It seems 
problematic to define mathematical laws as springing up from physical regularities. What we 
can read off from physical regularities usually translates rather into physical laws, which have 
a different necessity from mathematical necessity. We learn about electricity with different 
resources, aims and methods from those we use to understand the proof that √2 is irrational, 
for example. It is not enough either to say that we follow certain mathematical techniques 
because of regularities in our human practices, because 'it is simply what we do'. Needless to 
say, we are prone to make mistakes in measures and calculations and it actually takes a lot of 
effort to master mathematical operations. It is far from being something that 'comes natural' to 
us. At the very least there remains the question of why we choose one mathematical 
technique over another, why we happen to choose the correct one and how we correct 
mathematical mistakes. Why are some regularities 'hardened' into mathematical rules and 
others are not? How do we make the distinction? We now turn to construct a possible 
explanation of how a mathematical rule acquires its status. 
 It must be clarified from the outset that the analogy of placing a mathematical 
statement in the archives of language so that it becomes a standard to rule over the correct 
use of expressions is something Wittgenstein himself criticises. He admits that '[e]ven if [we] 
think of a proof as something deposited in the archives of language - who says how this 
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instrument is to be employed, what it is for?' (RFM III §29) This suggests that a full account of 
the necessity and workings of mathematical proofs must be backed up by a description of 
their use. 
 One way to interpret this extra need for an understanding of the use of mathematical 
expressions is to consider that mathematical theorems are rules supervenient on experience, 
yet independent of experience (Steiner, 2009, p. 10). Granted, a mathematical proof need not 
be causally connected with empirical regularities, but may have another type of connexion. 
Steiner phrases it thus: 
 'arithmetic cannot be in contradiction with empirical regularities because arithmetic rules are stipulated to 
 be derived from these very facts. (Because they are stipulated, they are also necessary.) At the same 
 time, arithmetic propositions provide the formal standard for what is called a fact. Conventionalist 
 readings of Wittgenstein, at least those which imply that an alternative arithmetic to the standard one is 
 an option, are radically mistaken: arithmetic and geometric theorems are indeed rules, but they are the 
 only rules available.' (2009, p. 12) 
Arithmetic rules are derived from empirical facts only in the sense that they are stipulated 
from the obtaining of regularities. We see results repeat themselves when we group objects, 
measure time or draw certain diagrams. Their regularity sets them as standards, necessary 
measuring rods to which facts must conform. These standards make up measuring systems, 
formulae, calculations. Using them we obtain the concepts for what we are going to call 
'equal', 'same', 'correct', and all we need to conceive any form of fact, all we need to trace the 
limits of what is meaningful to express, what we are going to call 'true', 'false', 'possible' 
'contradictory', etc. And for that matter, considering the ubiquitous character of mathematical 
discourse, as we philosophically define mathematical standards we also delimit intelligibility. 
 Yet we must be careful and take some distance from Steiner as he remarks that '[t]he 
only degree of freedom is to avoid laying down these rules, not to adopt alternative rules. It is 
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only in this sense that the mathematician is an inventor, not a discoverer.' (2009, p. 12) Here I 
want to say that we really do not have the choice of laying or not laying them down. Not to be 
confused with a radical conventionalist, Wittgenstein is very clear in explaining that 
mathematical proofs are not arbitrarily constructed as we go along, but that their necessity is 
perfectly defined; and yet he keeps our heads levelled by understanding the necessary 
character of mathematics as stemming from the equally non-arbitrary human activity and form 
of life. Distancing himself from behaviourism with equal strength, he declares: 'The proved 
proposition is not: that sequence of signs which the man who has received such-and-such 
schooling produces under such-and-such conditions.' (RFM VII §8) Such thought is too 
simplistic and ignores the fundamental character of a 'route' that a proof has, the route that 
guides us to a specific new understanding. We arrive at different results via different routes 
(RFM, VII, §3), that is why a proof can guide us, in a particular path, and also compel us to 
stick to our mathematical rules blindly, without providing the choice of 'not laying them down'. 
 Another, more subtle, point where to draw distance from Steiner's interpretation is 
when he remarks that Wittgenstein considers that the applicability of arithmetic depends on 
the existence of many sorts of stable objects, and the applicability of geometry depends on 
regularities of measuring locally Euclidean spaces (2009, p. 22). I merely want to avoid a 
misinterpretation: arithmetic and geometry do depend on these empirical features, yet the 
applicability of mathematics seems to be a much more complex notion. Even though features 
of the empirical world are certainly pivotal in the generation of mathematical thought, they are 
not needed for other practices of mathematics. That is, Wittgenstein's view does not force us 
to do mathematics exclusively with an aim of empirical application. There is nothing 
particularly obscure or illegitimate about, say, the concept of infinity, even though we do not 
'experience' it as we experience instances of the commutative law of addition or how we see 
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a flying object draw a parabola. Basic and advanced mathematics remain linked to their origin 
in empirical regularities, and this agreement in action which starts in very basic activities like 
counting is carried further by the proofs (RFM IV §30). Proofs expand mathematical 
understanding to unforeseen techniques and conceptions. From counting and adding small 
quantities of medium-sized goods, proofs take mathematical reasoning to infinite extensions 
and numerical expansions, keeping each new development in logical order thanks to their 
rigorous derivations. 
 
2.1.2 Reply to Wright 
Wright argues above that if we should follow Wittgenstein's rule-following account, we would 
have to commit not only to the idea that there is no reality behind mathematical rules, but that 
truth in general would be constitutionally responsive in the same way, i.e. truth statements in 
general would not refer to anything but would be established according to our ongoing 
judgements and reactions, so that there would be no objective reality of any sort. I do see 
how an observation in mathematical necessity has repercussions in understanding in general, 
but it does not necessarily have to reject truth in general, or imply scepticism of the physical 
world or make any form of objective knowledge impossible. Wittgenstein actually argues that 
mathematics plays a particular role in understanding, one that impinges upon and involves 
changing the way we look at the world, not the world itself. Mathematics' role, in short, does 
not hang on correspondence with fact. 
 It may seem that the remarks that equate proofs with conceptual modifications, that 
affirm mathematics changes the way we look at the world, are nothing but very general 
observations of the profound implications that mathematical knowledge growth has in our 
lives. Certainly, mathematical progress changes our outlook on the world and very 
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fundamental concepts, the way we relate to our surroundings, to changes, the links we can 
make amongst disparate fields of research, the ways we can frame and transmit information. 
But if this is just a wide epistemological claim, then it needs to clarify why mathematical 
knowledge in particular works like that, i.e. through conceptual modifications, or if all 
knowledge works the same way. Moreover, these mathematical achievements, even if we 
agree to call them 'conceptual changes', do not explain much about how a proof is derived 
and what its result means, mathematically and philosophically. For, in terms of its logical 
structure, we are supposed to believe, Wright's argument goes, that in the course of a proof 
the premisses and rules of inference involved in its derivation are going to change, they will 
mean different things when we begin the proof and once we have proven the proposition in 
question. If this is what a proof is supposed to do, it is not hard to raise the objection that 'it 
would be as appropriate to urge that the effect of verification of a prediction furnished by a 
physical theory would be to modify the concepts on which it is based.' (Wright, 1980, p. 49) In 
other words, if we follow this account of knowledge growth as concept-modification, we could, 
say, predict that a certain comet will be visible in the Earth's Northern Hemisphere from 4:35 
AM to 4:48 AM on 15 March 2021, and we could make the comet's passing by the Earth a fact 
regardless of what actually happens, with enough modifications on the concepts of 'comet', 
'solar winds', and every astronomical notion and formula used to make the prediction. We can 
just say on the date that now we understand them differently, and even if the skies are 
completely clear all day we can change astronomy just enough to satisfy the prediction, and 
still call it legitimate astronomy. Of course, this is not how we make scientific observations and 
predictions, but so far no evidence has been raised that would push us to believe that 
scientific and mathematical knowledge are on a par in terms of their significance, methods, 
acquisition and growth. 
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 Wright forgets the sharp distinction Wittgenstein makes between factual discourse and 
normative discourse, and the unique normative character he assigns to mathematical 
statements. Wittgenstein actually affirms that in many regions of discourse, particularly in the 
factual discourse of physical sciences, we use genuine propositions, and genuine 
propositions have the form 'This is how things are', not 'This is how things must be', the latter 
being the form of a normative statement, which pertains to logic and mathematics. Of course, 
scientific discourse follows its own governing, prescribing principles, but it is also largely 
constituted by descriptive statements and empirical generalisations. Mathematics, on the 
other hand, is constituted exclusively by rules and norms. We apply, as Wittgenstein says, the 
calculus of truth-functions to factual discourse (PI §136), that is, we say of factual propositions 
that they can be true or false, we operate with them to depict possible states of affairs. But 
such is not the task of mathematical propositions. Mathematical statements are measuring 
standards, not descriptions of things we measure (RFM III §75). A particular measurement 
can be true or false, but the measuring system itself does not 'engage' with truth, it is rather 
antecedent to truth and falsity claims. A mathematical proposition holds not because it depicts 
a state of affairs that obtains, but because of agreement, because of the regular working of 
measurements (íbid.) in a shared form of life. Measuring standards and measuring results 
together form a sound and objective measuring system. 
 Consider a group of people that have been trained in the same measuring system. 
They measure the height of a tower and all but one get the same result. We are entitled to 
suspect that the one person with a discrepant measure might have measured wrongly. Indeed, 
we make them all repeat the measurement a couple of times and, not surprisingly, by the last 
time everyone gets the same number. The hitherto dissident was in fact giving a false result, 
asserting 'the tower is n metres tall', a fact that did not obtain. But what was never put into 
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question while these people tried to solve the matter was the system of measurement, 
perhaps because they had all worked with it before and considered it a correct, effective 
standard. It is only because the system of measurement is taken as unassailable that they are 
able to correct the dissident and make the true result prevail. Likewise, if the dissident had 
been correct in their measurement, then the only way to make the rest of the group follow suit 
would be to refer to the technique, to tell them 'see, you misapplied the technique here' or 
'you did not take such-and-such into consideration'. Now it becomes evident that we also 
need confirmation from empirical reality, the thing measured, to be sure that we are 
measuring correctly. Using mathematics is not a matter of convincing others that my 
calculations are correct, it is not the case that the majority will establish correctness at will. If 
we didn't compare and apply results we could just as well measure however we liked, change 
the system as often as we liked. This dependence on communal agreement is an important 
and often muddled idea that Wittgenstein painstakingly advances to define his notion of 
mathematical objectivity. 
 There is indeed a way of reading the above argument that leads to conventionalism, 
but Wittgenstein is not driving his point this way. He wants to keep the objectivity of 
mathematical results without arguing that such objectivity rests upon the existence of 
mathematical facts, properties or relations. To argue this he draws heavily from his 
observations on how linguistic expressions are meaningful and how there are correct and 
incorrect ways of using them. For language to work there must be 'agreement not only in 
definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements. [...] It is one thing to obtain and 
state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain 
constancy in results of measurement.' (PI §242) This way, Wittgenstein makes it clear that we 
do not agree on what is true and false in the sense that we just decide on it, but rather, 
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because we share a language and a form of life, we share our measuring systems (cf. PI 
§241), and thus we can determine if statements like 'the tower is n metres tall' is true or false, 
regardless of who considers it either way. In other words, we share mathematics and this 
means a correct use of mathematics, which allows us to deal with the empirical world through 
procedures which are objectively correct. 
 Still, even if we accept that conceptual modification applies only to the mathematical 
case, Wright remarks that if we could 'discern an alteration in our concept of, for example, the 
pattern of application of a particular rule of inference, brought about by the application of it 
made in the proof, then the proof would fall short of complete cogency precisely at the point 
where that rule is applied.' (1980, p. 43) So, in one sense, our notions of logical inference and 
of all the intermediate steps we take while deriving a proof, would always be changing, under 
Wittgenstein's view. Wright adds that, in another plausible interpretation, Wittgenstein's 
account would actually turn on itself and not allow conceptual changes at all, for such account 
has no objective criteria from which we can detect two states in our knowledge, a 'before' and 
'after' the proof, if you will. The picture evoked is something like playing a game we always 
alter, we would not know when we started playing with new rules if the rules are always 
changing. If we would make a new move, we would change the whole of the game, so that it 
would make no sense to ask if the move is allowed or not, there is just no objective account of 
how the game is supposed to go. If everything changes in mathematics then, so to speak, it 
all remains the same: we cannot account for new developments if we do not have a base 
from which they stem, if it is all in permanent motion. 
 'Unless one's understanding of an expression may be thought to have a determinate character, it seems 
 to make no sense to speak of a modification in it; but if it may be allowed to have a determinate 
 character, it would seem that it would at least have to make sense that certain linguistic moves made 
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 with it should accord with that character. How, then, are we to reconcile Wittgenstein's sloganising about 
 concept modification with his repudiation of the idea that our understanding of expressions reaches 
 ahead of us to so far unconsidered situations in a predeterminate way?' (Wright, 1980, pp. 47-48) 
 Let's clarify the last lines: Wright refers to Wittgenstein's rejection that there is some 
substantial content to rules, that rules are 'about' something, as we have examined in the 
previous chapter. So Wright is demanding either an acceptance of the determinate 
characteristics of mathematical statements, that is, to accept that we do not construct 
mathematical meaning, but that such is established from the beginning, and proofs are just 
auxiliaries that point us in the direction of mathematical truth; or a rejection of conceptual 
modification as a genuine mathematical advance. If mathematical expressions have no 
established meanings, then what is going to change once they are proved? 
 The problem with Wright's argument is that it still understands mathematical 
statements as contentful (descriptive) when Wittgenstein has been arguing to accept them as 
rules (prescriptive). Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that a mathematical proof indeed 
represents a conceptual change in mathematics. Wright detects this problem: after the 
change of the concept of mathematical statement S, with the advent of its proof, what account 
can be given of what S used to mean? (1980, p. 43) We can reformulate the question in 
Wittgenstein's terminology, to be fair: after the change of the concept of mathematical rule S, 
with the advent of its proof, what account can be given of what S used to prescribe? Framed 
in the latter way, we can see that, to begin with, S would not be a rule without a proof that 
would 'put it in the archives'. So it seems Wright is separating a mathematical statement and 
its proof in a questionable way. He asks, what happens to S when we have the proof of S? 
Well, obviously, it is proved. We can tell what Fermat's Last Theorem means when it is only 
stated as the conjecture written in the margin of a book, but it will be more intelligible to us 
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once we learn some algebra and higher mathematics. Yet we did not have the proof of it for a 
while. Even now, many of us know it is proven, yet are not fully capable of reading and 
following the entire proof. If I learn about elliptic curves, perhaps the theorem will reveal itself 
in its full meaning, and that means, using Wittgenstein's terminology, that I will know how to 
use it, I will be mathematically competent to employ the concept. This is the kind of change 
brought about by mathematics, a change in our abilities. 
 But Wright's objection is more complex. Let us suppose that statement T expresses 
after the proof3 what S used to express before the proof.   
Perhaps we can put it this way 
T = S ˄ Sp 
Where T is a proved statement, S is the statement that got proven and Sp is whatever set of 
statements, rules and theorems we need to derive in order to get to T. In other words, roughly 
put, Sp is the proof of S, that is, the very mathematical insights, the new understandings in 
algebra or topology or group theory that allow us to put S in the archives of mathematics, right 
in the place where it belongs.   
It is clear from Wright's argument that we cannot have 
 
T = S 
 
for the whole point is to distinguish them. What marks the difference is precisely Sp. So 
Wright has tacitly accepted this formulation: T = S ˄ Sp. This respects Wright's idea: T 
expresses what S used to express before the proof (1980, p. 44). Now, he goes on to ask, 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that in this example Wright provides the variable T for the proven statement, and S for the 
statement before the proof, but he does not assign a value, or at least attach some significance, to the proof 
process itself. He leaves it out of the account. 
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should T be regarded as proved by the proof of S? He concludes that Wittgenstein has no 
correct way to answer this. 
 For, if T is not proved by the proof of S, then it is wrong to accept T as a proof of S (that 
is, wrong to accept it as Sp). But if T is proved by S's proof, then what can T express other 
than what S expresses? If there was a concept modification in S, so that S expresses what it 
now expresses, how can we avoid allowing that accepting the proof as a proof of T modifies 
the sense of T? So, 'there cannot in principle be, even by outright stipulation, any way of 
expressing what was formerly meant by a statement whose meaning changes as a result of 
its receiving a proof which conforms with its meaning.' (íbid.) 
 Let us reformulate that more clearly. The argument distinguishes a proposition and a 
proven proposition. S and T are to be regarded as synonyms, so that a proof proves S if and 
only if it proves T. But the analogy, I want to argue, does not stand because Sp ≠ S. That is 
the whole point. A proof is not a reaffirmation of the conjecture, it is a complex account and 
tracing of the place where the statement belongs. Proving is selecting, accommodating. By 
understanding where it is in the mathematical network and what role it plays, our use of the 
statement is upgraded, in a manner of speaking. Such is the conceptual modification. 
 Let's say S states GC, to remind the reader:   
 
GC: All positive even integers ≥ 4 can be expressed as the sum of two primes 
 
T would have to establish the above statement beyond doubt. Sp would provide the tools to 
do so. Yet, just as we right now can only say, or rather speculate, that every even number 
greater than or equal to 4 can be read as the sum of 2 primes, the proven statement would 
presumably amount to much more information. Here Wittgenstein suggests we rather think 
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that the proof would change our understanding of the mathematical question. Think of all the 
understanding of elliptic curves that was involved in the proof of Fermat's Last Theorem, for 
instance. Theorems are not isolated truths standing on their own, but normative, rule-like 
propositions that belong to, and transform within, mathematical techniques. T has to account 
for all the mathematical development that the proof of S brings, it cannot just stand for a final 
statement, a truth of some sort. So 'what S used to mean' or 'what S used to express' turns 
out to be a not entirely cogent concept. 
 Wittgenstein argues that a proof derives a proposition which serves as a rule by which 
we will abide, yet not only does it tell us 'this is how you must now proceed', it also show us 
how we are to follow it. The proof leads to a specific mathematical application. 
 'The proof constructs a proposition; but the point is how it constructs it. Sometimes, for example, it first 
 constructs a number and then comes the proposition that there is such a number. When we say that the 
 construction must convince us of the proposition, that means that it must lead us to apply this proposition 
 in such-and-such a way. That it must determine us to accept this as sense, that not.' (RFM III §28). 
 
 Wittgenstein insists that, because of this prescriptive role, it is not accurate to classify 
mathematical knowledge, or to use his term, mathematical understanding, as advancing very 
sophisticated assortments of truths, in principle very much similar to those we obtain from 
sciences, and more so the more theoretic the latter get. This last type of reasoning goes 
something like this: if we can buy the existence of positrons, of which we have no direct 
sensory evidence, then why doubt the existence of, say, the real numbers? They seem 
similarly intractable, after all. For many philosophers, the comparison is sound enough to 
trace parallels between mathematical and scientific statements. But Wittgenstein denounces 
this as a counterproductive, dogmatic way of thinking. For him it is a procrustean effort to 
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make mathematics fit a model of knowledge that deals with truths. 
 Now, Wittgenstein does not forbid making descriptions of what rules are about, so long 
as we understand that no fact pins them down. To elaborate, no isolated fact could be what a 
rule refers to, but a rule-governed series of facts could. Ultimately the emphasis lies in that no 
sort of fact could be claimed to correspond to a mathematical proof. We do not discover a fact 
in the proof, the proof is not pointing towards a fact that laid there independently of it, so that 
the proof is merely our way of getting to it. But a series of facts that follows a pattern and has 
a constancy, better defined as a regular practice (see section 2.2.1 below), sanctioned by 
communities that share a form of life, can more accurately reflect what a proof achieves. 'I 
want to say that what we call mathematics [...] hangs together with the special position that 
we assign to the activity of calculating. Or, the special position that the calculation...has in our 
life, in the rest of our activities.' (RFM VII §24) That special position is the origin and support 
of the inexorability of mathematics. 
 But then how does Wittgenstein propose to establish the standards for correctness of 
mathematical practice through mathematical practice itself? He calls our attention to the fact 
that measuring and calculating are not learned through definitions. The meaning of the word 
'length' is learnt by learning, among other things, what it is to determine length (PI II, xi, p. 
225), that is, by learning how to perform the action of measuring in a community of fellow 
measurers and understanding when it is done correctly and when it is not, to be able to spot 
errors and correct them. A similar, apparently less controversial, phenomenon occurs in 
scientific communities. Note that, for instance, when we explain the reliability of physicists' 
beliefs we make use of physical modes of justification (Linnebo, 2006, p. 563), including 
descriptions of how, for example, our senses receive the information from physical 
phenomena. If we can accept physical explanations about physical sciences, then why cannot 
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we do the same with mathematical practice? That is, why can't we employ sorts of justification 
that belong to mathematical techniques to explain the nature and necessity of said techniques? 
 To say that we have the mathematics we have because we have been trained in a 
certain way is not, however, intended as a final philosophical answer to explain the 
normativity of mathematics. Wittgenstein acknowledges the difference between saying that in 
following a rule we go by a signpost, and explaining what this 'going-by-the-signpost' consists 
in (PI §198). The first is just to highlight a causal connexion. But by describing in detail the 
practices, customs and regularities behind such training and following of mathematical rules 
as signposts, we come upon key concepts of correctness, agreement, rule-following and 
practice, which surround the notion of mathematical proof. Similarly, Linnebo distinguishes an 
explanation that ensures that a process is reliable from an explanation of what makes it the 
case that the process is reliable (2006, p. 563), which is a more external explanation, draws 
more distance between what is assumed and what is explained. Even if it assumes that 
certain claims and methods are reliable, it still sets out to determine why they are so, and why 
such methods are conducive to finding out the truth of such claims (Linnebo, 2006, pp. 564-
565). How do we know our mathematical methods touch upon an objective correctness 
instead of just inventing one that is prone to fall into error? After all, we could be in what 
Linnebo calls a 'lucky fool' scenario (2006, p. 549), namely that, upon being questioned about 
a mathematical proof's correctness, a person or a community may just luckily happen to get 
the answer right (by tossing a coin and deciding on its outcome, or by any other haphazard 
method, for that matter). The mathematically competent community differs from the lucky fool 
in that the former has followed theories, moreover in that they have followed theories for a 
reason, which is somehow connected to the theories' being true (Linnebo, 2006, p. 556). 
Wittgenstein must explain how this happens, why it is not an accident that we use the correct 
73 
 
mathematical theories. For Linnebo, this is actually a question of why mathematicians only 
accept true sentences as axioms (2006, p. 561), but we can read it also as a question that 
Wittgenstein's rule-governed community can and must answer. Linnebo proposes an answer 
that closely resembles Wittgenstein's view, arguing that 'mathematicians’ tendency to accept 
as axioms only true sentences is adequately explained by pointing out that the historical 
process that led to the acceptance of these axioms is a justifiable one according to the 
standards of justification implicit in the mathematical and scientific community.' (2006, p. 561) 
The problems with this explanation are that it comes from within the science that is being 
questioned, and also does not account for how the knower gets to know truths. In a way, this 
account assumes that the practitioners of the discipline in question are justified in practising it, 
and uses this justification to account for their axioms and mathematics and their reliability. 
This is why Linnebo calls it an 'internal explanation', since it intrinsically sets out from an 
alleged connexion between the practitioners' beliefs and the subject matter of these beliefs 
(Linnebo, 2006, p. 562). But is there any way we can actually explain a branch of science's 
reliability without employing the sort of justification that is peculiar to the science in question? 
Wittgenstein and Linnebo would agree in that there isn't, but would also point out that even 
more 'external' explanations would ultimately rely on internal elements of the theory in 
question. We can, and do, examine scientists' methods and claims with contemporary science, 
and find explanations of how our perception works 
 'having to do with light being reflected from our physical surroundings and impinging on our retinas, and 
 this information’s being interpreted by our visual system. As this example shows, external explanations 
 too have to rely on claims from the contested discipline. To explain the reliability of our perceptual 
 beliefs, we have to appeal to our knowledge of light and of the workings of our perceptual system. And 
 this knowledge is ultimately based on the verdicts of our senses.' (Linnebo, 2006, p. 564) 
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Thus we can account for mathematical objectivity and reliability without commitment to 
mathematical content or truth and rather attending to our mathematical practices within our 
form of life. 
 
2.2 Proofs and experiments 
Wittgenstein's distinction between proofs and experiments is exhaustive and resonates in his 
philosophy as a whole. To examine it carefully, let us begin by distinguishing simpler 
calculations from experiments and then proceed to account for more complex mathematical 
statements, like those found in proofs. We see that a calculation has an internal, unbreakable 
relation with its result, expressed in the '='. '2 + 2 = 4' reveals the interchangeability of 
elements on either side of the '='. The result is taken as the criterion for one's having gone by 
the rule (RFM VI §16), that is, if we do not obtain the sum result '4', then we simply have not 
added '2 + 2'. Contrary to this, the conditions of the experiment do not include the result (LFM 
X, p. 97). An experiment consists precisely in searching for results, so there are no 'wrong' 
experiments (LFM X, p. 94), in the sense that the results in empirical reality do not have to 
conform to anything. The burden is rather on us, we must register the findings faithfully and 
make sense of them in our scientific theories. 
 In scientific research, discoveries add to our knowledge of the world. Such research 
deals with problematic cases in a particular way. For example, if we find an organism that 
cannot be classified in standard taxonomy, perhaps a new phylum must be created to explain 
what we found and fit it in with the rest of biological theories. We cannot ignore the organism, 
we have to explain its existence. On the other hand, in mathematical proofs' derivation, it 
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seems the proof alters our understanding, rather than provide us with new facts. The answers 
the proof provides seem to open the scope of what we can conceive, instead of giving us 
more constituents of reality. 
 Wittgenstein elaborates on the distinction: ‘In a most crude way–the crudest way 
possible–if I wanted to give the roughest hint to someone of the difference between an 
experiential proposition and a mathematical proposition which looks exactly like it, I’d say that 
we can always affix to the mathematical proposition a formula like “by definition”.’ (LFM XII, p. 
111). He is analysing the uses, the grammar that rules over the word ‘proof’ (MS 122, 74r, in 
Mülhölzer, 2005, p. 69), for it is a grammatical distinction what tells experiments from proofs, 
namely the different role they play in language and the different uses we give them. The 
premiss is that both types of statements, those used in calculations and those in experiments, 
are often presented as propositions that look very much alike. In both cases, we seem to be 
talking about the nature of things, pointing at their characteristics, describing their relations. 
We use expressions such as 
'7 and 3 make 10' 
'Red blood cells and plasma make blood' 
'Force equals mass times acceleration' 
Here we need to make sense of the predicates 'make', 'equals', 'is' and what they are about. 
We must remember that in the mathematical case, the sentence is not signalling a fact, but 
stating a mathematical norm. This is, I take it, what Wittgenstein means when he stresses that 
a mathematical statement is withdrawn from experience and taken 'to the archives': it is 
consolidated as a standard. That is why we check the correctness of our multiplications with 
the multiplication tables. We trust them as standards. 
 But we trust many different types of standards, for instance very general empirical ones, 
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like physical laws and constants. Why are even the most general natural laws not quite as 
certain as mathematical axioms? Why are the principles of Newtonian mechanics not 
regarded as mathematical? Wittgenstein replies that an axiom is such 'not because we accept 
it as extremely probable, nay certain, but because we assign it a particular function, and one 
that conflicts with that of an empirical proposition.' (RFM IV §5) Mathematical postulates about, 
say, spaces and planes are not general truths about geometry, but norms that regiment our 
concept of space. Their necessity is at an altogether different level from general laws, for '[a] 
proposition which it is supposed to be impossible to imagine as other than true has a different 
function from one for which this does not hold.' (RFM IV §4) If we can imagine the opposite of 
what a proposition holds, or if we can imagine the fact it describes not obtaining, then it is not 
a mathematical proposition. 
 An experiment has an open outcome. There are no wrong results in an experiment4, 
we just set out to see what we find. In an experiment we perform certain actions, like make 
chemicals react or release objects in a vacuum, and see what results from it. We register the 
facts and try to make sense of them, why they happened and so on, but we are genuinely 
awaiting an unknown outcome, even if we have an idea, sometimes a very precise idea, of 
what we should expect. Mathematical statements, on the other hand, are characterised by 
certainty. The very criterion for performing a mathematical operation correctly is that we get a 
                                                 
4Up to a point, of course. We must consider at least 3 provisions. First, we do not proceed entirely 'blindly' in 
empirical research, but with certain methodologies, expectations, instruments of research and previous 
results which guide our way. Secondly, there are also, for example, demonstrations in lecture rooms that are 
supposed to conduct an experiment in a determinate way to teach students about certain phenomena, so in a 
strict sense they do not produce discoveries, but then again they are 'fixed' experiments, predetermined for 
teaching purposes. Finally, there are also empirical results that an expert on the subject would immediately 
recognise as mistakes produced by some wrong procedure during the experimental process, outcomes that 
simply could not have occurred without some tampering on the experiment. Apart from these types of cases, 
which are rightly acknowledged by Wittgenstein (cf. LFM X, p. 98), we want to say, the experiment is an 
instrument that leads to discovery, a procedure in which we set out to find new truths. An experiment differs 
from a proof in the sense that, even though both have theories that back up their procedures, in experiments 
we must also accommodate results so that they are faithful to reality. We discuss below if there are similar 
'surprising' results in mathematical proofs. 
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certain result from it (RFM VI §22), whereas the result of an experiment is left undetermined, 
it is an authentic discovery. 
 We can begin to see more clearly the motivation of Wittgenstein's hostility against the 
idea of the content of mathematical proofs, of them signalling facts. Such is 'not an objection 
to the term "fact" itself, but to the illegitimate use of the term outside the "language game" in 
which alone it has meaning' (Steiner, 2009, p. 14, fn. 18), that is, outside empirical discourse 
or the discourse of physical sciences. According to Wright (cf. 1.3.2 above), Wittgenstein's 
view leads to the conclusion that we ultimately decide what is true, in any matter whatsoever, 
as we go along. But arguing against mathematical truth, Wittgenstein is simply pointing out an 
illegitimate use of terms which 'leads to the universalization of the term "fact", and the 
appearance of pseudo explanatory theories using "fact" as a technical term of academic 
philosophy. One of these is the "theory" that every true proposition is true "in virtue of" the fact 
that it expresses, which then requires "mathematical facts" à la Hardy.' (Steiner, 2009, p. 14, 
fn. 18) 
 We cannot conceive mathematics as depicting facts because mathematics does not 
share the bivalence, the possibility of being true or false, of empirical statements. It does not 
share it because we cannot fully imagine a well-established mathematical result to be 
different from what it is. We may consider, off-handedly, that we can surely utter and 
understand '2 + 2 = 5' as a statement of arithmetic, without grave consequences, except that 
we would be making a false statement. The problem is that an incorrect mathematical 
statement is not false, but stops being mathematics altogether. The full implications of coming 
to terms with '2 + 2 = 5' surpass our imagination5. By coming to terms I mean to actually use 
                                                 
5Mathematicians like Tim Gowers (2009) sympathise with Wittgenstein's treatment of statements like '2 + 2 = 5' 
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'2 + 2 = 5' in our mathematical operations, consider it unassailable like multiplication tables, 
make it a part of our understanding of the world, of how we join and separate objects, etc. 
This is what must be understood correctly: such non-feasibility is at the same time a logical 
impossibility and a restriction placed by our form of life. The statement '2 + 2 = 5' is utterly 
incompatible with what we have established as 'unit', 'quantity', 'number' in our counting and 
adding techniques. 
 A factual proposition has content, it pictures a possible state of affairs. We could say 
that the content of a rule is a set of instructions. A proposition provides information, a rule 
prescribes instructions. But isn't an instruction information after all, i.e. information about 'what 
must be the case'? It is, in a way, yet it does not have all the properties of empirical 
information. For instance, when we have a mistaken belief about an empirical phenomenon, 
we picture a fact that does not actually obtain. We believe a false proposition. When we are 
mistaken in mathematics or in another rule-governed activity, we picture something more 
difficult to characterise. What if I imagine a possible move in chess? I am in the middle of 
playing a game and, assessing the situation, I think I will deliver check-mate in 3 movements. 
I imagine how the game would continue, how my opponent will move and the spaces be 
uncovered. But then when the game progresses I realise it is impossible to do checkmate in 3 
moves. What happened? It will be difficult to say at first glance, but suppose I took a record of 
the game and all its moves. At some point I would go back and study the game in question 
and find which rules I did not apply correctly or which blocking move was available to my 
opponent when I thought it was not. Were these errors already contained in the original plan 
                                                                                                                                                                       
in considering they should not be treated as falsehoods, but rather as statements that involve thinking, or 
trying to think, of a form of life, or at least a significant number of activities, incommensurable with ours, 
where, for instance, counting with fingers highlights different things (the gaps between the fingers instead of 
the fingers), and containers change the number of objects we put in them, to entertain some examples. 
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of attack? It seems they are not contained in the first move, say. So where are they? Are they 
in the second one? But could I have arrived at the second one without the first? Presumably, I 
could at some point in the match see that I am heading for a bad move and change strategy. 
But it is only if I carry out the attack completely, considering of course my opponent's moves, 
that its fault will be revealed. Again, I would have to look at the whole technique I am 
employing, not isolated movements. Let us put someone else in this situation, in terms of 
what pieces remain in the board and who's next to move. Maybe they have a different plan, 
maybe they also make my first move, but planning to do other things. And, if they don't make 
the mistake I did, they might succeed delivering check-mate in 3 moves even if we both 
started with the same movement and I failed. So was the mistake in my first move but not in 
theirs? It seems the mistake does not follow from a particular move, but from the activity of 
playing in certain specific directions, different 'routes' if you will. A mathematical proof is 
analogously a specific route that provides a particular insight. Let us remember that for 
Wittgenstein '[l]anguage is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your 
way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way 
about.' (PI §203) I believe something similar can be accounted for in the construction of a 
mathematical proof. For example different contributions made by new mathematical proofs of 
the same theorem, we could say, are different routes that provide different understandings. 
 Now, the concept that the proof forms, whatever it might be, brings with it at the same 
time the compulsion to accept it, that is, that 'this is how it must be', e.g. a geometrical 
construction must be so, a mathematical series must extend to infinity, etc. The proof-
construction convinces me that proceeding according to the same rules produces the same 
result. What it convinces me of is expressed in the proved proposition, which tells me, 
compels me, to proceed in a certain way (RFM VII §72), to follow certain mathematical rules 
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and calculations. Conviction comes with the formation of the new concept. We are convinced 
that the same configuration will follow in all cases. By 'same' here, Wittgenstein means the 
ordinary concept of sameness, the one we have acquired through our linguistic training, and 
that follows the ordinary rules of comparison and copying (RFM III §72). 
 In one sense, the mathematical statement is an objective 'fact' of arithmetical 
techniques, but in any case it is a fact only within calculating. Note that Wittgenstein does not 
write 'within calculus' or 'within arithmetic' or 'within number theory', but 'within calculating', as 
an activity (RFM III §58). So if we learn facts within our arithmetical education, these are not 
about properties of numbers or something of the sort. What we learn is to unfold and develop 
the capacities of a calculating technique until we master it, like a language-game. 
 Wittgenstein uses an example of mathematical induction to distinguish mathematics 
from empirical statements. Suppose we are working with an Archimedes Spiral, in which a 
function determines how tight the spiral is. The spiral intersects points with a constant 
separation distance.  
 
Fig. 1 Archimedes Spiral 
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We can extend the line and, making some calculations, using the formula, figure out the exact 
point where the 3000th cut will be made. How are we so certain of this? How can we just 
neglect so many steps? (LFM XXXI, p. 288). If the spirals are drawn correctly, then what we 
obtain in the formula must be the cutting point. 'This is a declaration of geometry-[and tells us 
nothing about the world]. It is a new rule. If we continued the spirals with a gauge and it didn't 
come right, we might say that the spiral wasn't Archimedean or that something had happened 
to our gauge.' (LFM XXXI, pp. 288-289, Wittgenstein's own brackets). Mathematical 
statements, then, do not tell us something about how the world is, but give us standards to 
which the world must conform. On the basis of them we judge if something must happen 
(LFM XXXI p. 289). 'That our 3000 steps [with the spiral and the gauge] will produce this 
result is an experiential proposition. But that this result is correct is a rule. We don't allow any 
experiential process either to refute or to establish a rule.' (LFM, XXXI, pp. 289-290, original 
brackets) 
 Mathematical propositions are grammatical (RFM III, §26); experiential ones are factual. 
The conviction a proof provides comes from its being grammatical, being a rule or an 
instruction we accept and by which we proceed, just as grammar governs over the 
formulation of correct expressions. If there is something that mathematical proofs are about, 
then we could say they contain instructions. 'The mathematical proposition says to me: 
Proceed like this!' (RFM VII §72), 'I act according to the proposition that got proved.' (RFM VII 
§74) In a proof it becomes clear what its mathematical application is, its use is revealed and 
now we can accommodate it with the rest of mathematics. It comes as a package: the proof-
derivation, its certainty, its compelling result, its conceptual change. A mathematical proof 
should not display or spot a mathematical feature. It is not an arrow that lands on a 
mathematical fact. The arrow, as it were, is the very proof, its trajectory constitutes the 
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instruction, the recipe, as Gowers puts it (2009, p. 193) to make mathematical constructions. 
The mathematical proof constructs a sign that has, we can say, its compulsion built into it 
(RFM III §29), it does not depend on mathematical facts. In other words, proofs do not acquire 
the status of norms because they describe how mathematical objects or structures stand. 
They are certainly derived from other statements and axioms, but they do not arise as 
descriptions of any sort of reality. This directly opposes Frege's idea that 'the normative force 
of the laws of logic is due to the fact that they are true descriptions of the general features of 
concepts and objects' (Friedrich, p. 10). 
 Consider also Wittgenstein's discussion of the parallel postulate (henceforth PP, 
defined above, fn. 3). When we first learn about the postulate, experience definitely plays a 
part in our understanding of it, but not in the sense that experience shows it to us. '[W]e 
haven't made experiments and found that in reality only one straight line through a given point 
fails to cut another.' (RFM IV §2) Imagination tells us it. Before the proposition, the concept is 
still pliable. Once the concept is fixed in the proof, a restricted use has been specified for it. 
The restricted use is illustrated, for instance in that, convincing as PP is, working with 
hyperbolic geometry it does not hold. This is what Wittgenstein has in mind about a proof 
bringing a conceptual change, in this case changing our conception of space. Postulates do 
not present us with new chunks of space to discover and analyse, but provide new 
possibilities of navigating through it, as it were. 
 If someone does not acknowledge a proof result as correct, and instead endorses one 
that is blatantly incompatible with the axioms with which we started to derive, and to which 
this person assented, then they are better described as proposing a different axiomatic 
system or conceptual framework than as erring about a certain subject matter (Friedrich, p. 
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14). This is what a reductio in a proof, as the one above about the irrationality of √2, amounts 
to: it is not a falsehood to consider √2 is rational, but a misplacing, a confusion. 
 
2.2.1 Empirical regularities and the salience, or 'hardening', of mathematical rules 
Wittgenstein makes a distinction between empirical regularities and empirical facts (RFM IV 
§50), and points out the very different roles they play in language. He writes that there are 
some propositions which, though they are empirical, we cannot doubt, if making judgements 
is to be possible at all (OC §308). The propositions he is talking about are sanctioned 
experiences, or 'meant experiences' like seeing a pattern, always linked to a process and a 
result. To speak about such empirical regularities we need a common backdrop that decides 
what is regular and what is exceptional. And to understand sameness and difference in the 
first place we must inhabit a language and a mathematics that teaches us these concepts. 
Thanks to the interaction of regularities in human behaviour and regularities in nature, all 
within our form of life, we get the necessary conditions for the entire institution of rule-
following (Steiner, 2009, p. 5), for the establishment of meaningful expressions and 
delimitation of what makes sense in language and mathematics. 
 With regularities like these we begin our logical reasoning: 
 'Someone who hears a bit of logic for the first time at school is straightway convinced when he is told 
 that a proposition implies itself, or when he hears the law of contradiction, or of excluded middle. -Why is 
 he immediately convinced? Well, these laws fit entirely into the use of language he is so familiar with. [...] 
 The proof convinces him that he must hold fast to the proposition, to the technique that it prescribed; but 
 it also shews him how he can hold fast to the proposition without running any risk of getting into conflict 
 with experience.' (RFM VII §73) 
Once again, in examples like these Wittgenstein explains logical compulsion as the 
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compulsion of following rules in a technique, not as a consequence of a discovery of a 
mathematical feature. 
 Only because we know our way through the assigned, calculated steps of a 
mathematical technique can we make predictions of the results we will get in a mathematical 
operation, and of course predictions applied to empirical reality. '[W]e should not call 
something "calculating" if we could not make such a prophecy with certainty. This really 
means: calculating is a technique.' (RFM III §66) We can make predictions because 
techniques conform with regularities, otherwise the technique would just give out, cease to be 
effective. Wittgenstein clearly states that language is based on regularity, on agreement in 
action (RFM VI §39). It is in the salience of certain regular patterns that we begin to 
accommodate a mathematical insight. 
 Wittgenstein wants to challenge the idea that mathematical proofs reveal truths about 
facts that are 'already there', already built into abstract mathematical reality. Under such view, 
proofs are the roads that connect us from mathematical truths to more mathematical truths, 
and these (proof-) routes are already traced, even if no one ever happens to go through them. 
This can be eloquently summed up in Frege's idea that the Pythagorean theorem is 
'timelessly true, true independently of whether anyone takes it to be true. It needs no bearer. It 
is not true for the first time when it is discovered, but is like a planet which, already before 
anyone has seen it, has been in interaction with other planets.' (quoted in Brown, 1999, p. 
136) In a similar vein, for Hardy, a proof is, taken to an extreme, merely accessory indications 
of a more direct discovery in a perfectly identifiable realm (1929, p. 18). He did not downplay 
a proof’s importance but presented a proof as if it ultimately served to communicate results, 
somewhat indirectly at that. So it seems that, at least in principle, the proof is separable from 
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the knowledge obtained by it. This is precisely what Wittgenstein wants to oppose. Yet, he 
also aims to keep a strong notion of mathematical objectivity, that is, that the correctness of 
mathematical proofs is established solidly by independent criteria, independent of arbitrary 
individual or collective decisions. These criteria lie on the very practice of mathematics. To 
understand this, however, one must stop thinking of mathematical practice as a collection of 
isolated facts and see them within a technique, as we explained at the beginning of this 
section. 
 The 'hardening' of a regularity into a rule does not depend exclusively on our 
recognition of the regularity, or in a communal decision to treat it as necessary. So what does 
it depend on? How is the common use of mathematical operations tied to the necessity of 
such operations? Again, let us remember that a mathematical rule 'doesn't express an 
empirical connexion but we make it because there is an empirical connexion.' (LFM XXXI, pp. 
291-292) Such connexion lies in the empirical world, outside the proof. The regularity 
hardened into a rule becomes a new kind of judgement in this sense: when we master a 
calculating technique, we know how we need to compute the relevant operations to obtain 
correct results. In this sense there are no surprises in the derived results. Consider a more 
simple example of what Wittgenstein is trying to do here: we don't happen to apply an 
operation we know well, like '+1' in the cardinal numbers series, and get surprised at the 
result obtained each time we count one more. Rather, we know how to recognise that the 
operation has been applied correctly, and so we can judge future results, we have 'a 
paradigm with which experience is compared and judged.' (RFM VI §22) As Wittgenstein 
points out, we can now say that a person worked on a calculation and got x instead of y, 
because we know y is what must result if the technique is applied correctly. 
 We learn, for example, that if one set of objects has been arranged in the form of a 
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(usually-shaped) human hand, so that to each finger corresponds an object; and another set 
has been arranged so that an object corresponds to each of the angles of a pentacle, we say 
the two sets are equal in number (RFM I §30). We incorporate this image into our actions, so 
that if we group objects using both arrangements and don't get an equal number, we check 
what we did again to see if we maybe omitted something or forgot to count an object or an 
angle. 'And if it were not like this the ground would be cut away from under the whole proof. 
For we decide to use the proof-picture instead of correlating the groups; we do not correlate 
them, but instead compare the groups with those of the proof' (RFM I §31), so that the proof 
becomes our standard measure, a paradigm of language (RFM I §32). We refuse to take any 
other path except the one the proof directs us to (RFM I §34) and consider it the essence of 
figures or groups of objects that they conform to such proof-picture. 
 Steiner notes that we can explain the notion of hardened regularities if we understand 
that mathematical statements are rules which are supervenient on experience, yet 
independent of experience (2009, p. 10). Let's say a group of people gathers apples and puts 
them in a special container. The first time they do this they manage to fit 400 of them. The 
next day they happen to fit 400 again. This keeps happening for some time. At some point, 
they firmly and surely report that, say, the company that bought 11 containers will have 4400 
apples to deal with. Now they are using a mathematical operation. They will trust more in their 
calculations than, say, reports of individuals of how many apples have been packed, how 
many have they sold, etc. We could say, they trust them because the statements are no 
longer contingent, they are normative, they are about numbers rather than about fruit. Yet if 
we leave it at that, distinguishing that one kind of statement talks about numbers and another 
about apples, this confuses again the sphere of mathematics and that of scientific, contingent 
statements. Wittgenstein suggests we rather consider the numerical case as the use of a 
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mathematical technique, which undoubtedly makes us see the adding of our apples in a new 
way, we understand why our groupings of apples yield certain quantities, and why it must be 
like that. 
 Likewise, we are not uttering an empirical statement when we say which number 
follows when we are counting. ‘That is not the empirical proposition that we come from 449 to 
450 when it strikes us that we have applied the operation +1 to 449. Rather is it a stipulation 
that only when the result is 450 have we applied this operation. It is as if we had hardened the 
empirical proposition into a rule. And now we have, not an hypothesis that gets tested by 
experience, but a paradigm with which experience is compared and judged.’ (RFM VI §22) I 
believe here he has a correct, yet underdeveloped idea of how it is a regularity, not an 
isolated fact of grouping objects together once or twice, what convinces us of the necessity of 
the techniques. For example, the operation '200 + 200 = 400' is not a model for the fact that 
200 things plus 200 things yield 400 things. When we group 200 objects with another 200, of 
course we can say they actually, in fact, yield 400 as a total. Yet if we take '200 + 200 = 400' 
as a criterion of correctness for the addition of these numbers, then the statement announces 
an arithmetical rule, it becomes normative. It is not an empirical generalisation. Only when 
we've learned to add do we develop expectations about outcomes, and look at the operation 
of grouping things together differently. We know something is 'going to happen', we know to 
expect a result, and only one, with complete certainty. So a categorial change occurs when 
we 'elevate' an experimental use of an expression to a mathematical use (LFM XII,  p. 112). 
Steiner reads a proof-derivation similarly, as a change of a propositional status. A proof is a 
specific mathematical route that makes ('hardens') propositions expressing empirical 
regularities into propositions expressing rules (2009, p. 2). So it seems the proof, like 
mathematical techniques, shows why a regularity must obtain, why its pattern must be the 
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case, but also how, specifically, through a specific route, the regularity and the proved 
propositions are internally related. 
 Wittgenstein is not undermining the necessity of mathematical proofs by arguing that 
no matter how well we understand what is going on in a proof-derivation we are never 
completely constrained to assent to it, as Wright seems to suggest (1990, p. 94), an idea 
which becomes even more confusing when, as Wright also notices (1990, p. 95), Wittgenstein 
writes that every reproduction of a proof must also reproduce the compulsion to obtain it 
(RFM III §55). We are entitled to ask how a proof can merely guide us towards a conception 
of things and at the same time compel us to accept it (Wright, 1990, p. 95). Wittgenstein 
carefully explains what he means by this apparently double standard: 
 ‘“The rules compel me to…”–this can be said if only for the reason that it is not all a matter of my own will 
 what seems to me to agree with the rule. And that is why it can even happen that I memorize the rules of 
 a board-game and subsequently find out that in this game whoever starts must win. And it is something 
 like this, when I discover that the rules lead to a contradiction. I am now compelled to acknowledge that 
 this is not a proper game. […] What is it that compels me?–the expression of the rule?–Yes, once I have 
 been educated in this way. But can I say it compels me to follow it? Yes: if here one thinks of the rule, not 
 as a line that I trace, but rather as a spell that holds us in thrall.’ (RFM VII §27) 
It is blatantly obvious why his critics are impatient with his explanations. What could it possibly 
mean to understand that mathematics holds us in thrall? Well, we can say that Wittgenstein is 
simply insisting that the compulsion to accept a proof comes within a specific training, not as 
a raw, brute force of logic. We always get compelled in a certain way, in a certain path. 'What 
is unshakably certain about what is proved? To accept a proposition as unshakably certain -I 
want to say- means to use it as a grammatical rule: this removes uncertainty from it.' (RFM III 
§39) What is proven is a guideline of how to use mathematical operations, a guideline we 
follow without hesitation and independently of our will. This automatic surrendering and 
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acceptance to the mathematical result is the only thing Wittgenstein wants to point out when 
he says a 'spell holds us in thrall'. We are simply obeying blindly mathematical compulsion, 
which we have learned to detect thanks to the techniques with which we live. An outsider, a 
dissident calculating agent, is immune to such spell, also completely foreign to our forms of 
understanding, thinking and doing mathematics. 
 Just to leave an example of how necessary it still is in philosophy to dispel ontological 
commitments in mathematics, Wittgenstein highlights that we often, mistakenly, think in 
mathematics as if standards were independent of our practices. We do this at very basic 
levels, thinking of lines and points, and something like the 'substance' of measuring standards, 
fixated on the individuation of 'the standard metre'. But it is unthinkable that the standard 
metre in Paris, or to be more contemporary, that the definition adopted by the International 
Committee of Weights and Measures6, would exist without the institution of measuring in the 
metric system. We can put the metre in the archives of the Committee but that is not what 
gives it its character of a standard. It has rather been our constant practice, checking against 
reality, trial and error, the way it has paid off to use such system, and the fact that we keep 
using it, what make it a standard. For someone who has never measured, the standard metre 
in Paris or the agreed definition means nothing. What would it mean for a large community to 
suddenly agree that the metre in Paris was a wrong measure and declare it was only 7/8 of 
the 'real' metre? Doesn't it look more like we cannot talk about a 'real' metre, but more of a 
current, widely used standard measure? 
 Mathematical definitions and proofs, again, are norms in the sense that they provide a 
                                                 
6The actual standard metre, made out of a platinum and iridium alloy, was still problematic and imprecise. Other 
definitions of the metre, like 'the distance light travels in a vacuum in 1/299792458 of a second' have been 
included to reduce uncertainty. These ongoing efforts to reduce the uncertainty in our measurements, and the 
importance we give to them, exemplify what Wittgenstein emphasises regarding the fundamental role 
mathematics plays in our lives. 
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standard of what counts as a correct deployment of mathematical concepts (Friedrich, 2011, p. 
9). A dissident, someone who does not derive, add, count, etc. like the rest of us, does not 
believe mathematical falsehoods, but, more accurately, fails to participate in the language-
game of mathematics (íbid.), parts company with us from the outset. 'The concept of 
measurement, like all concepts, is thus also grounded on regularities of behavior—but it is 
grounded as well in objective regularities of nature.' (Steiner, 2009, p. 5) The concept  
responds to a regularly executed technique, which in turn responds to the characteristics of 
the physical world. This backs the argument that our given form of life is an objective standard 
for mathematical correctness. It may seem trivial and even lenient to say that dissidents 
simply 'part company with us'. The logician is perhaps ready to be scandalised at the 
dissident's mistakes, but Wittgenstein reminds us the dimension of what 'parting company 
with us' consists in: it means to be ousted from any meaningful activity and discourse. It would 
mean to be banished to unintelligibility. As difficult as this is to imagine, that is how necessary 
and normative our mathematics are. 
 What a proof achieves is not a symbolic formulation or translation, but a sort of 
upgrade in a technique, to achieve which one needs to travel the road of practice. What 
happens with proofs in higher mathematics? Which regularity is hardened there? Maybe here 
we are still thinking within the scientific paradigm of 'higher' and 'lower' theoretical knowledge. 
Proofs expand and modify concepts which allow us to deal with empirical reality. Proving is 
primordially an activity that changes our understanding. Mathematics does not cease to be an 
activity at higher or lower levels. So long as we can frame a mathematical statement as a rule, 
part of a technique, we can keep Wittgenstein's notion of proofs as conceptual changes, as 
advances in the possibility of use of mathematical operations, at any theoretical level. 
91 
 
 The motivation for treating mathematics as a network of interrelated rules is ultimately 
to preserve an accurate account of the normative character of mathematical proofs. A proof 
should be necessary in the sense that we cannot think of its derivation being different. This 
amounts to it being impossible to imagine the proof's result as 'being false', or even that we 
cannot conceive of the mathematical fact it depicts as 'not obtaining'. Let us remember that '[a] 
proposition which it is supposed to be impossible to imagine as other than true has a different 
function from one for which this does not hold.' (RFM IV §4) As Gowers (2009) argues, we 
can try to imagine a world in which it would be natural to think that 2 + 2 = 5. But perhaps the 
sheer impossibility of making our way through imagining that 2 + 2 = 5 is the more natural 
thought. Wittgenstein and Gowers invite us to perform an exercise that is not feasible, and its 
non-feasibility illustrates how mathematical proofs set the standards of what is intelligible, 
what is thinkable. 
 Gowers mentions that there are mathematical terms for which, though they have a 
formal definition, it remains difficult to see what they define, what kind of objects they describe. 
This difficulty to see what is defined, what kind of object or fact, could be a favourable 
argument for Wittgenstein's stance and an effective, practice-based attack on the tenability of 
mathematical platonism. Then let us ask the mathematician: can we treat mathematics as a 
describer of truths or should we conceive it differently? Let us remember that Wittgenstein 
considers that to understand an expression is to know how to use it in the language where it 
belongs. So to understand a mathematical concept is to know how to use it. How can we be 
sure that we understand it correctly? Again, Gowers suggests a very philosophical way to find 
out: if we can transmit the mathematical understanding to a computer, then we can say we 
master it. He suggests we 
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 'think what you would have to program into a computer if you wanted it to handle a mathematical 
 concept correctly. If the concept was an ordered pair, then it would be ridiculous to tell your computer to 
 convert the ordered pair (x,y) into the set {{x},{x,y}} every time it came across it. Far more sensible, for 
 almost all mathematical contexts, would be to tell it the axiom for equality of ordered pairs. And if it used 
 that axiom without a fuss, we would be inclined to judge that it understood the concept of ordered pairs, 
 at least if we had a reasonably non-metaphysical idea of understanding - something like Wittgenstein’s, 
 for example.' (2009, p. 192) 
Avigad makes a related remark about faults in proof assistants, software used as aid to derive 
mathematical proofs. Regardless of all the data and instructions fed into programmes, these 
are still a long distance away from supporting, for instance, algebraic reasoning. This is telling 
of our own lack of full understanding of algebraic inferences and reasoning, even in very 
simple cases (2008, p. 345). Whatever efforts we direct towards a better understanding of 
such reasoning, it is useful to have as a goal the possibility to programme such knowledge 
into a computer. Wittgenstein's rule-following approach seems to lend itself for these fruitful 
purposes. 
 
2.3 Conclusions 
This chapter exposed and defended the cogency and relevance of Wittgenstein's account of 
mathematical proofs, clarifying some of its problematic claims and dispelling subtle, well-
engrained misrepresentations of his unorthodox remarks. This exposition hinged on a 
vindication of Wittgenstein's concepts of mathematical practice and techniques, and their 
importance not only in pragmatic matters but also in the very way we think about mathematics, 
in the way logical compulsion permeates proof-derivation and in the way mathematical 
objectivity is established and sustained. 
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 Through Wittgenstein's distinction between experiments and proofs, we arrived at a 
clearer difference between descriptions and norms, empirical falsity and mathematical 
misconception, factual discourse and normative discourse. The examples and arguments 
supported the claims that analysing mathematical proofs as pointing towards mathematical 
facts, or relating proofs to any sense of mathematical content whatsoever, is problematic and 
unnecessary. In the particular case of proofs, it was clarified that the progress a mathematical 
proof brings consists in recasting the identity of a mathematical statement: to prove a 
statement is to identify it as necessary. The proof makes this transition, taking us in a 
particular deductive route from what is the case to what must be the case (RFM IV §29). This 
draws distance from empirical procedures, where we rather report what is the case, setting 
out in any methodological route that faithfully depicts our findings in empirical reality. The 
mathematical 'must' does not express a mathematical truth, but rather our inability to depart 
from the concept introduced by a proof (RFM IV §30), for such concept is necessary as part 
of a mathematical framework that delineates all meaningful thought and action. 
 We see it proves quite useful to draw from Wittgenstein's observations in language 
when it comes to define the necessity of mathematical statements. Just as he writes in PI 
§329: 'When I think in language, there aren't "meanings" going through my mind in addition to 
the verbal expressions: the language itself is the vehicle of thought', he affirms an analogous 
thing about proofs, namely that there aren’t any 'meanings' going through our minds in 
addition to the mathematical calculations: the calculation or proof itself is the vehicle which 
takes us to a new concept, not from contentful mathematical assertions to new mathematical 
assertions. 
 Wittgenstein has the merit of linking pre-theoretical linguistic practice with the 
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theoretical network of mathematics, an often overlooked source of philosophical insights. 
Analysing such practice, we can draw a solid notion of mathematical objectivity based on the 
concepts of sameness, difference, correctness and all the notions needed to establish rule-
following in language. With these, we can argue that the reasons why we accept a proof as 
necessary are external to the proof (RFM III §41), referring to the objectivity of empirical and 
cultural regularities that engage in language and that establish the correction criteria for proof-
derivation, yet also affirming that it is not something behind the proof, but the proof, that 
proves (RFM I §42), referring to the specific derivation that a proof constructs, and also 
pointing out that a proof is not an assertion that refers to a mathematical fact which, in 
principle, could have been reached otherwise. 
 Nonetheless, Wittgenstein recognises the lack of a sharp boundary between 
propositions of logic and empirical propositions, and considers this reflects the lack of a sharp 
boundary between rule and empirical proposition (OC §319), considering how close empirical 
regularities are both from empirical and normative discourse. He is not one to give the final 
answer that settles the sharp boundary, but reports this as a result of his philosophical 
analysis, and it may be a starting-point for further research into the parallels and differences 
between mathematical and scientific claims, which may in turn help us decipher the nature of 
proofs. 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
Chapter III. Seeing new physiognomies 
This final section recapitulates what can be extracted as Wittgenstein's philosophical 
contribution to the understanding of mathematical proofs, its insights and limits, and leaves 
some open questions that may guide us to further analyse if these are relevant to 
contemporary debates in philosophy of mathematics. Regardless of what the answer might 
be, this paper has presented a less simplistic account of Wittgenstein’s views on 
mathematical proof, providing a less dismissive and deeper analysis of his approach. It has 
addressed important criticisms and given space for the reader to carefully examine the 
dialogue between Wittgenstein and some of his more critical interpreters. We have argued 
why his remarks on proofs cannot be incorporated to the ranks of conventionalism or 
intuitionism, and have justified his objections to the notions of mathematical content and truth. 
The rest of the paper makes some final remarks about what we can understand from a proof's 
result bringing about a conceptual change, and if such change really entails mathematical 
progress. We end by suggesting that Wittgenstein's account makes important methodological 
observations, namely about the similarities between the research methods of philosophy and 
mathematics, how a mathematical proof and a philosophical remark do not follow scientific 
methods, but rather disentangle a confusing situation and bring it into clarity. 
 
3.1 Surveyability of proofs and the philosophical 'synoptic vision' 
One of Wittgenstein's central aims has been to point out that a mathematical proof achieves 
something quite difficult to define, but equally unique in its normativity: a conceptual change. 
This notion is pivotal in his philosophy, it is necessary to understand his distinction between 
normative and factual discourse, his opposition to mathematical truth, his definition of 
mathematics as a rule-governed activity. He spends a lot of time suggesting how to make 
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sense of a proof producing a conceptual change in mathematics, and providing examples to 
give an idea of its significance. He faces a difficult task, for if there is no body of mathematical 
truths to back up objectivity, it would seem we cannot have non-arbitrary criteria to distinguish 
between correct and incorrect mathematical calculations. But Wittgenstein argues that this 
philosophical call for mathematical facts to sustain mathematical objectivity is not legitimate, 
but comes from 'habits' in our linguistic practice. The thing is we have a very useful method 
for problem-resolution in empirical sciences. It is undoubtedly effective, and Wittgenstein 
recognises this, never puts it or scientific objectivity in question. What he points out is that this 
methodological habit can be harmful when we use an experimental approach to solve a 
mathematical question. Problem and method then simply pass by one another (PI II xiv) and 
no real progress is made, because we are not posing the right questions in the first place. In 
philosophy, and in philosophy of mathematics in particular, we often want the answers to fit a 
certain model, instead of looking at what we are trying to analyse, ignoring the benefits of 
looking at what the expressions and concepts mean in our daily activities and uses. We 
presuppose that the work to be done resembles digging deep for more basic components or 
layers of mathematical truths. Wittgenstein's philosophy is important in that it denounces the 
poorness of our results when we follow such methods, at least in the sense that we are not 
achieving what we set out to do, i.e. we have not set unquestionable foundations for 
mathematics, and we have not fully explained whence comes the compulsion in deriving a 
proof correctly. Mühlhölzer remarks that Wittgenstein takes an entirely different philosophical 
approach by calling us back to see the grammar of the word proof (2005, p. 70), that is, the 
linguistic standards that govern the use of proof in daily mathematical practices, and also by 
reminding us of our familiar mathematical practice through exhaustive examples and 
descriptions (2005, p. 76), illustrating the normativity of mathematical techniques in multiple 
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scenarios. Wittgenstein thus advances methodological claims: he believes the way 
philosophy has traditionally defined necessary truths in mathematics has little to do with the 
actual source and the actual way of recognising necessity. Such misguidance, he goes on to 
say, reflects a fault in our philosophical practices themselves. All this goes hand in hand with 
Wittgenstein’s insistence that mathematical and philosophical analyses share a common 
feature: they both transform our understanding, rather than accumulate knowledge. ‘I want to 
say: “We don’t command a clear view of what we have done, and that is why it strikes us as 
mysterious.’ (RFM I App. II §8) That recommendation goes both for mathematics and 
philosophy. Our grammar often lacks perspicuity to clearly see the correct use of words. 'A 
perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in "seeing 
connexions".' (PI §122) Philosophy must come up with intermediate cases, diverse cases of 
applications and language-games to illustrate confusions and misuses of expressions, and so 
guide us back to their correct use. He proposes we apply a similar philosophical treatment for 
mathematics. 
 The tricky aspect is that mathematics is part of this law-giving grammar. As 
grammatical rules, the function of mathematical propositions is not to assert that such-and-
such fact obtains, but to supply a framework in which it is possible to make accurate 
assertions and descriptions (RFM VII §2). 'A “series” in the mathematical sense is a method of 
construction for series of linguistic expressions.’ (RFM II §38, emphasis mine) This is directly 
related to rule-following: we can get an instruction to, say, write the corresponding word 
beside a given word in a list. We see the first three elements 'free-independent; cold-chill; 
difficult-hard'. We are told 'go on in the same way', and we understand that we are to write a 
synonym of the word we get. Similarly, a series like the natural number series prescribes how 
we are to construct certain numbers following the application of the operator '+1'. In both 
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cases, we build expressions, those to express synonymity and succession in the  case of the 
examples, and learn to construct them for future uses. A derived proof is similar to such cases 
in the sense that it is a rule for description, it modifies what can be expressed mathematically. 
Consider, for example, Euclid's Theorem of the Infinitude of Primes. Briefly put, suppose that 
there is a finite number of primes, so there would be one largest prime, let's call it N. Now, we 
should be able to account for what the number N! + 1 is, i.e. the number we get by multiplying 
N by each of its predecessors and adding 1 to that total. The resulting number cannot be 
prime, for N is already the largest prime, following our hypothesis. So N! + 1 must be 
composite. If it is a composite, then it can be expressed as a multiplication of prime factors. 
But these prime factors must be greater than N, otherwise they could not divide N! + 1 without 
remainder, they would all leave remainder 1, considering how we constructed N! + 1 in the 
first place. Bottom line, we need primes greater than N to be able to factorise N! + 1.This 
logical, faultless reasoning runs against our hypothesis that there is one greatest prime and 
no more primes after it. We must reject it and affirm that, contrary to what we supposed, the 
sequence of primes goes on endlessly. We can say that this theorem gives us a 'recipe' for 
extending any finite list of primes (Gowers, 2009, p. 193), a justification and an endless 
permission to do so. This recipe-yielding mathematics echoes some points of agreement 
between Wittgenstein and formalism that cannot be fully explored here. 
 When Wittgenstein criticises ways of thinking like that of regarding number theory as 
the 'mineralogy of numbers', he reminds us of his pronouncement against 'the bewitchment of 
our intelligence by means of language' (PI §109), and urges we return to the spatiotemporal 
phenomenon of language (PI §108). Wittgenstein does not oppose or criticise pure 
mathematics nor favours exclusively applied mathematics, but strongly rejects conceptions 
that view philosophy of mathematics as accounting for 'the natural history of mathematical 
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objects' (RFM II §42), as if philosophy was supposed to unearth how mathematical 
statements and proofs direct us through to discover the details of a mathematical world. The 
details we do discover are those of the empirical world, and we describe them well enough 
with empirical propositions and methods, but it is mathematics that guides us in shaping the 
form of these descriptions, i.e. determining what is the correct use of expressions, 
establishing syntactic rules, creating a framework in which we can talk about correctness, 
sameness, truth, etc. I believe there is a way of keeping the full strength of mathematical 
compulsion, the one any mathematician would recognise in their daily work as pertaining to a 
proof, and at the same time reject that the route of the proof has already been traced, or as 
Wittgenstein puts it, to reasonably doubt that the mathematical rules already lead in a certain 
way, even if no one went it (RFM IV §48). 
 Wittgenstein insists a proof must be surveyable. This requisite has often been 
interpreted as evidence for Wittgenstein's rejection of very long proofs, proofs we cannot take 
in, or concepts like infinity. Such interpretation is partially correct. By surveyable, I believe 
Wittgenstein means something like 'ready for use'. Even a very elaborate tool remains useful 
if we properly know how to employ it, if we can use it for various purposes, if we command it. 
If a proof is surveyable it means that it is usable as a guideline in judging other mathematical 
statements (RFM III §22). The Hubble telescope may be a very complex instrument to use, 
yet if we master it and can use it for research then it becomes a basis with which to judge 
many astronomical discoveries. Wittgenstein compares mathematical proofs to 
cinematographic pictures, (íbid.) perhaps having in mind an instructional film, where the 
mechanisms are recorded once and for all and serve as a model for mathematical practices. 
This is how Wittgenstein wants to regard proofs: not as columns of symbols and derivations, 
but as graspable guidelines of how to operate in mathematics. The proven proposition shows 
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how something has to be, how some operation must be carried out, how some geometrical 
figure is to be constructed, to list some examples, and this transmission of its necessity 
depends on it being presented in a memorable, surveyable, configuration. Such configuration 
becomes impressed in our minds not because it is easily taken in, but because we now 
recognise it as a paradigm of identity (RFM III §9), a way in which we must proceed if we are 
to do mathematics at all. And yet, Wittgenstein does admit that a hugely long proof would be 
similar to our trying to understand '1000' in the form '1+1+1+1...' (RFM III §10). Such shape is 
not memorable, in the sense that if we see the long string of '+1s' we do not take in that they 
stand for '1000'. In this sense, a long proof would not be considered a proof in Wittgenstein's 
account, but not simply because of our human incapability of taking it in, but rather because 
we could not use it or apply it. Copying a proof does not make the mathematician understand 
it, just as a machine that checks the correctness of a long proof is not quite a mathematical 
agent like us (RFM V §2). Consider the Classification Theorem in group theory. Aschbacher 
(2005) challenges Wittgenstein's link between surveyability and usability in his remarks on the 
Classification Theorem by explaining that it is basically impossible, given the current available 
techniques, to write an error-free proof of such theorem, which looks more like a highly 
complex theory of physics. Aschbacher recognises that mathematicians take an idealised 
notion of proof as a model for which to strive but which does not necessarily occur every time 
(2005, p. 2402), and that does not mean the theorems are any less operational or useful. 
Does this undermine Wittgenstein's requirement for surveyability? 
 Not necessarily, I want to say. We could phrase Wittgenstein's requirement in 
Poincaré's terms: we do not only want to know whether all the syllogisms of a demonstration 
are correct, but why they are linked together in one way rather than another (quoted in Avigad, 
2008, p. 319). One of Wittgenstein's important insights is his equating of mathematical 
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understanding as having the relevant mathematical abilities. To understand a proof, for 
instance, means to be able to explain how we derive it, why we should choose its chain of 
derivations instead of any other. This is part of having a surveyable representation of such 
proof. It is, indeed, questionable whether Wittgenstein would consider the Classification 
Theorem as an authentic proof, since it does have uses, but it is available to comparatively 
few mathematicians and in very specific scenarios that necessarily involve higher 
mathematics whose use is difficult to pin down as straightforwardly as Wittgenstein would like. 
One must make a deeper analysis of how the Classification Theorem and other similar 
theorems are actually implemented in mathematical practice, what such practice consists in, 
how it connects to other areas of mathematics, in order to give a more accurate evaluation of 
Wittgenstein's views on surveyability. I believe this is a promissory field of philosophical 
research into which I cannot venture in this paper. 
 What Wittgenstein does affirm is that '[w]hen we say in a proof: "This must come out"- 
then this is not for reasons we do not see. It is not our getting this result, but its being the end 
of this route, that makes us accept it. What convinces us- that is the proof: a configuration that 
does not convince us is not the proof, even when it can be shewn to exemplify the proved 
proposition.' (RFM III §39) Wittgenstein's goal is to show that no reduction to simple logical 
components will show what makes the proof necessary. The correct derivation and 
presentation of the logical signs is a necessary, yet not a sufficient condition for a proof to 
have the character of being inexorably certain. Even if we spell out the axioms under which a 
formal system works, there would remain to explain what makes these axioms necessary, and 
why are we compelled to follow them, in an explanation that should draw some distance from 
the formal system's own principles. What convinces us is perhaps the link we make with other 
proofs, the insight that the proof unveils, which is unequivocally a practical insight: we see a 
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new possibility, a new operation, we see the technique has grown and we can perform new 
tasks with it. 
 Wittgenstein is not alone at this position. Avigad notes that there is a tendency in 
philosophy to take understanding to be the '"possession" of a meaning that somehow 
"determines" the appropriate usage' (2008, p. 324) of expressions.  Sometimes the object of 
understanding can be neatly packed in, say, an algebraic formula, but then this only delays 
the question about understanding momentarily, for we can still ask what it means to 
understand that formula, what it implies, when do we really grasp it. Again, beyond formal 
systems and placing statements in the archives, the relevant question in the end will still be if 
we know how to use a proof. 
 Due to mathematics' intertwining with language, as explained above, a proof ends up 
affecting what we can see and conceive very radically. A proof makes us see a new 
physiognomy, perhaps in a similar way as what we see when we understand why we perceive 
an optical illusion: we see something we already saw, but anew, with different salient features, 
new things to notice. If there is something to be found through a proof, we can say we find 
physiognomies, patterns, logical arrangements. We authentically find them, yet not in the 
ways of scientific discovery, but through use, like when we make different figures or planes 
coincide, and some new shape authentically emerges. When we understand the proof that an 
angle cannot be trisected using exclusively ruler and compass, it is in the course of such 
proof that we form a way of looking at the trisection of the angle, 'our way of seeing is 
changed -and it does not detract from this that it is connected with experience. Our way of 
seeing is remodelled.' (RFM IV §30) This is an interesting insight yet it can also be limiting for 
Wittgenstein's account, for it relies heavily on geometrical observations and does not do 
justice to the reasoning that occurs in other branches of mathematics, even at very basic 
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levels. Wittgenstein's remarks have to go beyond visual metaphors to become powerful tools 
for philosophical analysis of mathematics. 
 
3.2 Open questions 
As we saw above, Wright notes that Wittgenstein's arguments on mathematical proofs mix, or 
rather confuse, philosophical remarks on mathematics with remarks on understanding in 
general (1980, p. 49). I have argued that indeed Wittgenstein's observations on proofs echo 
wider ideas on the nature of understanding, but that they do so not necessarily in a confusing 
or distorted way. On the contrary, I believe we have seen there is merit in analysing 
mathematics not as a separate area of discourse, but as a network of norms (RFM VII §67) 
that impinges upon any and all meaningful expressions. 
 Wittgenstein has extensively argued that mathematical proofs change mathematics, 
yet it is still not clear how they change it. Wright explains one of the problems with 
Wittgenstein's conception of mathematical objectivity this way: if we say that accepting a proof 
of a statement changes its meaning, then it ought to be possible, after we have accepted the 
proof, satisfactorily to convey what our understanding of the statement used to be. But if we 
follow Wittgenstein's argument, he continues, it does not seem possible to give an account of 
how certain concepts were modified. Roughly put, there would be no stages we could identify 
as 'before' and 'after' the proof. It rather seems that it is typically in virtue of the understanding 
we already have (and maintain) of expressions and rules involved in our mathematical 
discourse that we are capable to accept new proofs. Correct proofs agree with the way the 
concepts involved in them are understood already. We even take the capacity to recognise a 
good proof as a criterion for having a proper grasp of the concepts involved. 
 Moreover, how can Wittgenstein's remarks guarantee that the proof we derive, whether 
104 
 
we understand it as a conceptual change or not, is derived correctly? Should we prove that it 
is so, maybe in another system? Would we then have to prove that we have proved the first 
result, falling into an infinite regress of proofs? Wittgenstein suggests an alternative: let us 
construct a proof in a way that can be taken in, with which we easily recognise the necessity 
of the result and are absolutely compelled by it once we go through it (RFM III §13), and by 
absolutely compelled here he means that we would follow it blindly, because it would be 
unthinkable for it to be otherwise, for us to use it in a different way and act (whether 
performing mathematical operations or in general performing our daily activities) as if the 
result were different. Here we can see that the source of compulsion to follow proof-
derivations is only fully accounted for in human action, in what we can and cannot perform 
otherwise. 
 I want to point out a mathematical reflection which, if tenable, could reconcile or at 
least shed some light on Wittgenstein's regard of the establishment of a proof as being 
somewhat of a decision and yet also as a result we are compelled to derive. It comes from 
Poincaré and reads: '[Mathematical] [d]iscovery consists precisely in not constructing useless 
combinations, but in constructing those that are useful, which are an infinitely small minority. 
Discovery is discernment, selection.' (Science et Méthode, quoted in Avigad, 2008, p. 320) If 
we are well-trained in a mathematical technique, then we know how to use it as a search tool, 
to search for solutions to new problems that may emerge. Mathematical understanding allows 
us to navigate this mathematical network of roads, or of norms, as Wittgenstein would put it 
(Avigad, 2008, p. 320). 
 Wittgenstein admits this seemingly contradictory idea: at the end of a proof one does 
not rightly know what one has proved by the old criteria (RFM III §14). To try to understand 
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this, let us go back to the miscount example above. When Connor learned to add he did not 
lose his counting abilities, but rather modified them. Now that he masters addition, he will 
count differently, make less mistakes, etc. We need new criteria to get out of the muddle and 
command a clear view of the proof, for example, by making a hitherto unsurveyable proof 
surveyable. Making it perspicuous is exactly the advance. Think of an example Wittgenstein 
uses to illustrate the rules we use for counting. We learn to count not only by adding one unit 
successively, we also learn 'shortcuts' depending on what we want to count. If we want to 
count all the months in 148 years, we don't have to count unit by unit, from 1 to 1776. We can 
just count '12+12+12...', presuming we still can't figure out that it's easier to multiply 148 times 
12. Taking 12 steps at once consists, for Wittgenstein, in regarding not the unit step but a 
different step as decisive. In the case of a proof, derived in a mathematical system we know 
quite well, we are guided by the formal rules step by step, yet at the end it is a different step 
that is counted as decisive (RFM III §20). Thus, in Connor’s case, we have introduced a new 
rule for counting, in which the old rule of counting unit by unit remains, and yet, has been 
developed in a new way. 
 In sum, if one reads the argument that mathematics forms and modifies concepts as if 
every new proof transformed the whole of mathematics, then of course it is an absurd claim to 
make. Wittgenstein argues that a conceptual change produces a new mathematics but not a 
new set of truths that is separate and unrelated to the 'former'. His idea is more akin to 
thinking that mathematics develops by transforming, expanding and connecting the uses of 
our many mathematical techniques. With a new proof, one does not end up with a new piece 
of mathematics, but with a new use. Understanding that the primes run on endlessly, as we 
explained above, gives us a better grip on mathematics, and multiplies the tasks we can 
perform with the new theorem. A new use means a different, better equipped mathematics, 
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not the destruction of a system. A proper mathematical change occurs when it affects the 
application of the technique we were using (RFM III §47), not by invalidating its previous use, 
but by coming to understand where it stands in the bigger mathematical picture. 
 I want to finish by challenging this dissertation, or rather by acknowledging that there 
are important points that Wittgenstein's philosophy of proofs must account for. One of the 
most crucial ones is to make the conceptual-modification account of proofs explain how 
mathematical techniques have unforeseen applications. This is not the place to make a more 
elaborate argument, but it is worth pointing out Steiner's observation that Wittgenstein's 
account does not explain how mathematical techniques can have 'unforeseen consequences', 
that is, that one such technique may serve us well in its original purpose, yet happen to work 
with other techniques, much like different scientific doctrines together give us a picture of the 
universe. After developing an argument that links mathematical techniques used in kinematics, 
topology and molecular physics, Steiner (2009, pp. 24-26) concludes that mathematics simply 
does not ever render superfluous information, that is, that what we may consider a useless 
feature of a technique will end up serving a purpose. Steiner writes that 
 'Wittgenstein’s account of mathematical application was seriously lacking. He apparently thought that the 
 use of mathematical concepts for unintended purposes is of no philosophical importance, like the use of 
 a knife to turn a screw. [...] [M]athematical concepts often contain within them the germ of further 
 applications—to see this, however, one must go far beyond the elementary examples that Wittgenstein 
 worked with.' (Steiner, 2009, p. 26) 
 
But this, again, returns to the view that mathematics describes aspects of reality, so that 
nothing is unnecessary in a mathematical technique, for we will find its meaning sooner or 
later. I want to end this note proposing that it may be possible to read Steiner's remark as a 
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confirmation of the view Wittgenstein has been insisting upon. That is, perhaps Steiner's 
observation points to two relevant arguments in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematical 
proofs: one, that there is a fundamental difference between mathematics and science, and 
that this lies in that the former does not describe facts nor, consequently, report truths about 
(some) reality; and two, that mathematics is first and foremost an activity, so that the proofs 
developed within it are expected to have multiple applications, regardless of what we first 
used them for. Just as, say, the 8 queens puzzle7 was not foreseen when chess was invented 
(and I believe it is safe to say chess was not invented to play the 8 queen puzzle game) so is 
the case with unforeseen applications. When people invented it, they imagined the whole 
game of chess, just as we imagine a mathematical technique. That is, we do not cumulatively 
build up a technique, just as we did not develop chess by first dividing a board, then having a 
'king', then 'bishops' and waited to see what happened with them. We do not say that '[s]o far 
that's all we know about the game; but that's always something.- And perhaps more will be 
discovered.' (RFM II §39) 
 Ultimately, the upshot of regarding a proof as a conceptual change, a change in what 
we can conceive and do, what we can perform in our techniques, as Wittgenstein suggests, is 
that then we pay attention to often overlooked aspects of mathematical practice and how they 
affect mathematics and knowledge in general. Wright is correct, Wittgenstein's remarks on 
mathematics spread unto understanding in general, but this might happen in a non-vicious, 
philosophically insightful way. 
 
 
                                                 
7The puzzle consists in placing 8 queens on a chessboard in positions where they will not attack each other, 
following the rules for the movement of the queen in chess.   
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